Who Guards Russia's Nuclear Button?

The independent investigative outlet Dossier Center has examined one of the most secretive units in the Russian military: the Special Strategic Communications Service, known as Service "K."

Officers from this unit are responsible for the so-called nuclear briefcases, and they accompany the president, the defense minister, and the chief of the General Staff at all times. Dossier reported on who serves in this elite group, how they live, and how much they earn for what is considered one of the most consequential jobs in the world.

On February 27, 2022, days after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin ordered Russia’s deterrence forces to shift to a special regime of combat duty. Since then, command centers of the Strategic Missile Forces, the Northern and Pacific fleets, and long-range aviation have been operating with reinforced staffing.

A small, classified group of officers plays a central role in any potential launch of nuclear-armed missiles. These officers remain near the head of state around the clock. They are responsible for linking Putin with the military and transmitting his order to strike. They are colonels and Navy captains of the first rank from Service "K."

Formally, the unit is the Special Strategic Communications Service of the president of the Russian Federation, also known as military unit No. 26299. It is commonly referred to as Service "K," a designation likely derived from "Kazbek," the automated command-and-control system for Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. The best-known component of that system is the "Cheget" terminal, often called the nuclear briefcase.

If Russia detects an incoming attack, satellites and other early-warning systems that track ballistic missile launches and explosions will transmit a "missile attack" signal. That signal activates Kazbek and allows command-and-control systems to shift from standby to combat mode. 

The president then uses the Cheget terminal to communicate with the defense minister and the chief of the General Staff, each of whom has a separate terminal. A preliminary command follows, triggering coordination across all elements of the nuclear forces. An atomic strike can then be authorized.

The president issues the primary authorization, but confirmation must also come from the other two terminals. The order is then transmitted down the chain to launch crews.

Russian doctrine allows for a first strike. Soviet-era nuclear planning also included the concept of a "launch on warning," under which a strike could be ordered if an attack was believed to be imminent. In such cases, at the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and the Defense Minister, the National Defense Management Center generates an “attack” signal that unlocks the launch mechanism. 

Putin himself has said he does not rule out having to use the nuclear briefcase. According to Valentin Golubkov, one of the developers of the Kazbek system, Putin regularly trains on it, including during simulated missile launches against mock targets.

The designers envisioned that senior officials would never operate the Cheget alone. Officers from Service "K" act as operators, carry the briefcase, and are prepared to defend it if necessary. They are issued pistols and eight rounds of ammunition. At least two officers are always present, each carrying a briefcase, one primary and one backup in case of malfunction.

Dossier identified 53 individuals who have been linked to the unit since at least 2021. The investigation relied on facial recognition searches, leaked databases, open-source materials, and internal Service "K" documents obtained from a source. These include personnel questionnaires, applications to renew top-level security clearances, duty rosters compiled after the start of Russia's War on Ukraine, travel orders, and other records.

The direct commander of military unit No. 26299 is Colonel Andrei Zhuravlev, who previously stood in operational duty himself and accompanied Putin during a visit to Japan in December 2016. Other service members hold operator positions and are divided into groups of about 10, each with a supervisor. 

A typical schedule involves two consecutive days on duty. Operators are not permanently assigned to specific officials; the same officer may accompany the president at one time and the defense minister at another.

Despite the unique responsibility and experience required, salaries in Service "K" are comparable to those of other contract soldiers. Before the war, monthly pay did not exceed R150,000 ($1,900). After the invasion of Ukraine, salaries increased. Documents reviewed by Dossier show that at least one non-command officer earned up to R260,000 (nearly $3,300) per month.

Most officers live in or near Vlasikha, a closed military town outside Moscow. Many come from multigenerational military families. The youngest officer identified is 39, the oldest 62, with an average age of 52. None was born in Moscow. Many come from former Soviet republics: nine were born in what is now Ukraine, five in Belarus, and one each in Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Latvia. Two were born in East Germany. 

Their lifestyles appear modest: infrequent family vacations to southern Russia, regular mortgage payments, inexpensive cars, and limited savings. Data leaked from the Federal Tax Service indicate that the average officer has savings of about R400,000 (around $5,000). Only four had deposits exceeding R1 million (approximately $12,700).

All are Russian citizens and hold top-level security clearances, granting access to the country’s most sensitive information. These clearances are regularly renewed under the supervision of the Moscow Military District’s military counterintelligence unit. Officers must coordinate nearly every aspect of their private lives, including preapproval of vacation destinations and travel routes. They are also required to disclose relatives living abroad, even in allied countries such as Belarus.

Against that backdrop, Dossier found it notable that one officer, Yevgeny Shikhov, has a sister who has lived in the United States for more than 20 years and holds U.S. citizenship.

Despite the unit’s secrecy, many Service “K” officers maintain an active presence on social media. Dossier identified 12 profiles on VK, nine on Odnoklassniki, eight on the Moy Mir (My World) platform, and two on Facebook. One officer, Sergei Marinin, posted dozens of photos on VK, including images from official events and inside the Kremlin. Some appeared to joke darkly about their roles: Colonel Maksim Pchelintsev used a profile photo showing a large red button being pressed.

Dossier also found dating profiles belonging to several officers, some seeking short-term relationships. Two others posted reviews under their real names on Google Maps, making it possible to trace their movements.

For many officers, the Special Strategic Communications Service represents the pinnacle of a military career. They tend to serve for long periods, often 15 years or more. Those who leave typically retire or move into defense-industry enterprises.