September 01, 2011

Stenka Razin and the Russian State


Stenka Razin and the Russian State

Three hundred and forty years ago the Razinshchina came to an end.

The two-year uprising, led by the Cossack Stepan (“Stenka”) Razin, was like a violent wave, surging north from the stormy Caspian Sea, spilling over the banks of the Volga, wreaking havoc, then retreating nearly as swiftly as it had arrived.

To be sure, this was not the first such storm Russia weathered. Sixty-five years prior, during the Time of Troubles, Ivan Bolotnikov led a revolt that reached the outskirts of Moscow before being defeated (see Russian Life, Nov/Dec 2006). Nor was it to be the last: Razin was to be followed, most notably, by Bulavinov and Pugachev.

Yet Stepan Razin reigns as Russia’s most memorable and popular rebel. Praised in Russian folklore, he won the hearts and minds of Russian intellectuals, chief among them the poet Alexander Pushkin:

 

Как по Волге-реке, по широкой


Выплывала востроносая лодка,

Как на лодке гребцы удалые,


Казаки, ребята молодые,


На корме сидит сам хозяин,


Сам хозяин, грозен Стенька Разин,


Перед ним красная девица,


Полоненная персидская царевна.

 

Down the wide Volga River

Sailed a sharp-nosed boat

Filled with brave oarsmen

Young Cossacks all,

Atop the stern is the Master Himself,

The Master Himself, the august Stepan Razin,

Contemplating a beautiful girl,

The captive Persian princess.

 

Later, Dmitry Sadovnikov, a nineteenth century Volga poet, wrote a song that would become widely known among all Russians. The song spoke of the Persian princess whom Razin threw into the troubled Volga waters:

 

…Чтобы не было раздора 


Между вольными людьми, 


Волга, Волга, мать родная, 


На, красавицу прими!



Мощным взмахом поднимает 


Он красавицу-княжну 


И за борт ее бросает 


В набежавшую волну.

—

Что ж вы, братцы, приуныли? 


Эй ты, Филька, черт, пляши! 


Грянем песню удалую 


На помин ее души!

 

To avoid a quarrel

Between free people,

Accept, Oh, Mother Volga

This beauty! 

 

And he lifts the pretty princess

With a powerful thrust

Throwing her overboard

Into the oncoming wave.

 

Why so sad, my brothers?

Damn, you, Filka, dance!

Let’s sing a bold song

To mourn her soul!

 

For over two centuries, the rebellious Razin has been the inspiration for writers and painters, who have glorified and magnified the Cossack, turning him into a romantic hero. Surely the best portrait of Razin was that done by Vasily Surikov (page 40-41), while the best novelization of his life was I Have Come to Set You Free (Я пришел дать Вам волью), by writer (and film director) Vasily Shukshin, who intended that the story be turned into an epic film. And Yevgeny Yevtushenko’s poem, The Execution of Stenka Razin, is a classic commentary on power and rebellion:

No,

it is not in this I have sinned, my people, 


for hanging boyars from the towers. 


I have sinned in my own eyes in this, 


that I hanged too few of them. 


I have sinned in this,

that in a world of evil


I was a good idiot. 


I sinned in this,

that being an enemy of serfdom 


I was something of a serf myself. 


I sinned in this,

that I thought of doing battle


for a good tsar.


There are no good tsars,

fool... 


Stenka,

you are perishing for nothing!


Bells boomed over Moscow.1

But it is not all glorification. Eminent historian Mikhail Pogodin, in an article about Razin in the Moskovityanin magazine expressed it well when he wrote: “Razin could have well become a second Yermak2 for Russia. But, due to hostile circumstances, he went astray and ended up being executed like a common bandit.”

 

Concealed behind the romantic figure of Razin is a rather more complex reality about the causes and effects of revolt in Russian history.

Russia had four major uprisings that in Soviet times were called “peasant wars.” Yet the truth is that in the two most significant revolts – those led by Bolotnikov and Razin – it was the Cossacks, not the peasants, who were the driving force and main combatants. And during the Bolotnikov rebellion, dissatisfied regional nobility at times fomented revolts even more cruel than those of the Cossacks.

Each major upheaval in Russian history had two causes: First, the state was weakened, be it due to internal troubles, external wars or a rift in the upper echelons of power. Second, remote towns and villages were suffering under excessive pressure from the center, applied by ruthless voyevodas (paramilitary chieftains). More often than not, the rebellions were spurred by taxes and duties that were too much to bear.

Enter the freedom-loving Cossacks. Always resident on the outskirts of Russia, they were loyal to the Tsar, as he subsidized and supported their existence, in exchange for the Cossacks’ defense of Russia. But they were also quick to revolt against those they saw to be traitors to the crown. Town dwellers would quickly surrender to rebellious atamans, and public servants sided with the Cossacks, as they too were often unhappy with the Powers That Be in Moscow or St. Petersburg… But only to a point – until the bandits revealed their true nature, which proved worse even than the tsar’s oppression. 

 

The seventeenth century has been aptly dubbed “the century of revolts.” During the Time of Troubles (Смутное время, 1598-1613) Russia was devastated by a famine that killed a third of all Russians,3 and overrun by Polish invaders. Russia was utterly spent by a devastation even worse than that of the USSR after the Great Patriotic War. Many townships and villages were swept from the face of the earth. Rich farmland stood deserted. Merchants and artisans disappeared.

In order to avoid further military debacles, to solidify the power of the new tsar, and also to find conscripts to recoup territory lost to the Poles, the government tightened its screws, trying to squeeze still more out of its subjects, in the process threatening their already meager subsistence. The resulting tension could not but lead to rebellion.

On June 12, 1648, a huge revolt flared up in Moscow (spreading to Pskov and Novgorod) that has come to be known in history as the Salt Rebellion. The immediate cause was the growing shortage of, and increased taxes on, salt, bread, honey and vodka, imposed by a cabal of greedy boyars surrounding Tsar Alexei, led by the avaricious Boris Morozov.

A few weeks later, on July 1, 1648, people pushed aside the security guards surrounding the tsar’s imperial carriage and lodged their complaints directly to the sovereign about his hated officials. The tsar listened to them, then moved on without announcing his decision. But the tsar’s convoy was delayed, and soon a fight broke out. The next day, negotiations held between representatives of the government and the protesters were unsuccessful – the imperious tone of the government representatives only heightened resentment.

A couple of days later, the capital was overwhelmed by riots. Insurgents broke into and ransacked the homes of the boyars Morozov, Miloslavsky, Trakhanyotov, Pleshcheyev and Chistov. The latter three were lynched, while Morozov and Miloslavsky took refuge in the Kremlin, where the tsar defended them. The riots continued for several days, and even clerics, including Patriarch Iosif, could not calm people down. Streltsy regiments,4 unhappy with wage arrears, joined the rioters.

The riots in Moscow ended only after the government paid off the streltsy and made substantial concessions, with Tsar Alexei promising justice. Morozov, Miloslavsky and other corrupt officials were dismissed. The state promised to streamline its laws and lessen punishment of those who had debts to the state treasury.

A direct result was Tsar Alexei’s Law Code of 1659. Meant to stabilize society through a codification of laws and regulations (among other things, it institutionalized serfdom), it granted serious concessions to both nobles and tradesmen, while stipulating severe punishment for all rebels. For example, Article 21 in the chapter “On Sovereign Honor” allowed capital punishment for all conspirators and rioters, for anyone who attacked or robbed government officials, in short, for all whom in any way encroached upon the Powers That Be and upon private property.

The Law Code helped calm the situation for a time, yet it certainly did not wipe out corruption. Thus, in 1662, a Copper Riot was triggered by a “reform” whereby the government issued copper coins, but collected taxes and duties in silver. Enraged Muscovites might even have taken down the tsar, had not the reform been hastily cancelled. Copper coins were collected, melted and repurposed.

Meanwhile, the situation in the outskirts of Russia was far from serene. It did not help that Russia was at war on two fronts, with Poland (from 1644-1667) and Sweden (1656-1658), which again increased taxes and conscription. The latter led many peasants to flee to the Cossack borderlands, to Siberia or the lower Volga – vast regions that had only recently been added to the Russian state and which, especially since the Time of Troubles, were outside the tsar’s “vertical of power.” The Cossacks readily accepted the northern fugitives into their swelling ranks, yet were unable to rapidly assimilate them in their timeworn ways.

In the Middle and Lower Volga regions, voyevodas appointed by Moscow, supplied with insignificant garrisons, were formally in charge of larger towns. Yet these towns were surrounded by vast territories controlled by free Cossacks, to say nothing of the strong, not yet fully subdued communities of Tartars, Mordovians, Chuvash and Kalmyks. Yet there were two distinct populations of Cossacks, those who were more settled and who received support from Moscow in return for their loyalty, and those who were nomadic, poor, accustomed to hard living conditions and radically opposed to Moscow’s strict rules and regulations. The new migrants of course fell into the ranks of the latter.

In addition to all this, Russia was experiencing a deepening religious schism, brought on by Patriarch Nikon’s reforms of 1652-1666. The Old Believers enjoyed considerable clout in the outskirts, and the most violent riots (and the most severe punitive actions) of the late seventeenth century arose under the banner of fighting for or against the “old faith.”

Thus, the entire region was a powder keg. Stepan Razin and his band of brigands would be the fuse. In 1667, after some time heading up a community of robbers along the Volga (exacting tribute from passing vessels) Razin and his band headed south and spent the next two years plundering towns along the Caspian, especially in Persia.

Returning to Russian shores in 1669, Razin and his band sailed into Astrakhan aboard ships outfitted with silk sails. Moscow, fearing Razin would pillage Russian towns, asked the Cossack ataman (chieftain) to stop Razin. But, insofar as said ataman was Razin’s godfather (and, moreover, had been promised a share of Razin’s Persian plunder), he replied that his Cossacks were powerless before Razin’s rebels. Moscow then tried appeasement, and offered Razin what amounted to a pardon from the tsar. But the truce lasted only as long as Razin’s Persian booty held out.

By 1670, Razin’s once motley and loosely-organized group of brigands had become a more or less orderly regiment, baptized by fire and fiercely devoted to their leader. In May, under cover of reporting to Cossack headquarters, Razin stormed the towns of Cherkassk and Tsaritsyn with some 7000 troops. The government strongholds of Cherny Yar and Astrakhan fell in June.

It was the “tradition” of mass uprisings in Russia that the territories taken by insurgents became lawless regions, devoid of morality or restraint. The only law in effect was the rule of violence. Thus, the so-called “struggle for social transformation” (per Soviet-speak) of such rebellions was usually nothing more than a bloody and merciless criminal terror. The Razin uprising was no exception. Insurgents rallied around the Cossack detachments and traitorous government troops. Impoverished serfs joined Razin’s army without a second thought, inspired, among other things, by the possibility of painting the town red or getting their hands on local landlords’ property. When Astrakhan was taken, Razin killed the city’s voyevoda himself and Astrakhan was subjected to a three-week rampage of bloodletting. The city was also declared a Cossack republic with Razin as its sovereign. Hoping for mercy, authorities in Samara and Saratov surrendered their cities without a fight.

Razin, as an exceptionally brave, desperate and smart leader, incited his followers to rebellion by making clear that their fight was not with the tsar (though they did nominally support Patriarch Nikon in his conflict with Tsar Alexei), but with the corrupt boyars and voyevodas, and he promised freedom to all who joined in his struggle. They were fighting, he said, against “bad boyars, those rotten traitors” and to institute the absolute equality of Cossackdom. Not surprisingly, this approach also garnered support from ethnic groups in the Volga region (i.e. Cheremis, Maris and Mordovians), which had been suppressed and divested of their lands by previous tsars.

I so much wished you well

on the shores of Persia,

and then again

when flying 


down the Volga on a boat!

What had I known?

Somebody’s eyes,

a saber,

a sail,

and the saddle...

I wasn’t much of a scholar...

Perhaps this was what let me down? 


The tsar’s scribe beat me deliberately across the teeth,

repeating,

fervently:

‘Decided to go against the people, did you?

You’ll find out about against!’

It was at Simbirsk (modern Ulyanovsk) that Razin’s forces finally faltered. Voyevoda Ivan Miloslavsky bravely defended the city, and when an uprising broke out and the Razin troops penetrated the trading quarters, Miloslavsky retreated to the local kremlin, where he and his people stood firm against multiple assaults. In October 1670, a large army led by Prince Yuri Baryatinsky came to their rescue. In the fierce battle that followed, Baryatinsky flung back Razin’s troops and rescued Miloslavsky and the city. Razin was gravely wounded in the battle, which proved a turning point. Meanwhile, all across Western Russia peasants were rising up and slaughtering their landlords and voyevodas. Stepan and his brother Frol were captured on April 14, 1671, in Kagalnik, but pockets of resistance continued throughout 1671.

The end of the story was quite predictable. Stepan Razin was taken to Moscow in shackles, severely tortured (and interrogated by Tsar Alexei), and quartered alive on Red Square’s Lobnoye Mesto on June 6, 1671.5 His head and limbs were mounted on stakes and his torso thrown to the dogs. According to “Russian tradition,” reprisal against the insurgents was more savage even than their own behavior in the towns and lands they had taken.

They are bringing Stenka Razin!

And with screams from wives of the Royal Guard

amid spitting from all sides

on a ramshackle cart 


he

comes sailing

in a white shirt.


He is silent,

all covered with the spit of the mob, 

he does not wipe it away,

only grins wryly,


smiles at himself:

‘Stenka, Stenka,

you are like a branch 


that has lost its leaves. 


How you wanted to enter Moscow! 


And here you are entering Moscow now...


All right then,

spit!

Spit!

Spit!


after all, it’s a free show.

There is no end to interpretations of the Razin rebellion. Some see it as the logical result of overbearing central authority, excessive taxation and conscription, others as a struggle between the dregs and pinnacles of society, others still as simple banditry that overflowed into rebellion by tapping into deep-seated resentment. Surely it was all these things, as well as a pitched battle of the center against the frontier, in which regional autonomy eventually gave way to increasingly centralized and autocratic rule – something that was happening throughout Europe in the seventeenth century. This aspect was keenly felt by the Cossacks, for whom Razin’s rebellion was the beginning of the end of their volnaya life. In August 1671, envoys from Moscow arrived in the Don and administered an oath of fealty to the tsar.

Astrakhan, meanwhile, remained under insurgent control until November, when it was overcome by a long siege led by Prince Miloslavsky. Soon thereafter, all remnants of rebellion in Astrakhan were brutally crushed. RL

 

Translation by Mikhail Ivanov

 

NOTES:

1. Here, plus excerpts below: The Execution of Stenka Razin (1964), Excerpted from Yevgeny Yevtushenko, the Collected Poems 1952-1990 (Henry Holt, 1991).

2. Yermak was credited with conquering Siberia and adding vast Siberian expanses to the Russian empire.

3. The famine was caused by a radical chilling of the planet, modern scientists have posited, following the eruption of a volcano in Peru.

4. Streltsy – literally “shooters” or “musketeers,” were the first permanent, regular regiments of the armed forces in Muscovy, and the best infantrymen in Russia. Organized in the sixteenth century, there were about 30,000 of them in Moscow during this time.

About Us

Russian Life is a publication of a 30-year-young, award-winning publishing house that creates a bimonthly magazine, books, maps, and other products for Russophiles the world over.

Latest Posts

Our Contacts

Russian Life
73 Main Street, Suite 402
Montpelier VT 05602

802-223-4955