The Spring Dinosaur

Russia’s annual spring military draft began April 1 and runs through July 15. As is often the case with things that have outlived their purpose, this dinosaur seems to get harder to kill with each passing year.

Russia maintains a “mixed” military, where about half of its ground forces consists of draftees aged 18-27 who serve for one year, while the other half are paid, contract soldiers.

This spring, the state seeks to draft 142,000 young men, down 10,000 from last year’s number, and about half the number it called up at the turn of the century.

As the number of annual draftees declines, the number of contract soldiers must increase, particularly if the military overall wants to hit the goal of a million man army (three years ago the Defense Ministry said 220,000 officers, 50,000 warrants, 425,000 contractees, and 300,000 conscripts was its goal by the end of 2017).

Despite difficulties (the draft process is notorious for being rife with corruption and mismanagement), the public still seems to stand behind the antiquated practice. A recent Levada Center poll found that 58 percent of Russians are for maintaining the draft, while just 37 percent are for a fully contract army.

Human rights activist Arseny Levinson, of the social initiative Citizen and Army, is not in that 58 percent. He says that for some warped, bureaucratic reason, “a system has arisen in which there is no shortage of draftees, but a shortage is being artificially created by the military commissariat,” which tries calling up those with poor health or who have deferments, but not those who would be willing and physically able to serve if they were called.

Valentina Melnikova, from the Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia, agrees, saying that there is no longer a need for the draft: “in principle, all military units would gladly refuse all draftees. It is a horrible holdover from the Soviet era, and nobody needs it.” (Except perhaps some draftees: it is difficult or near impossible to get a job in many government agencies if you have not done military service.)

Military observer Pavel Felgen-hauer concurs, noting that such a mixed draft-contract system exists nowhere else in the world, and the reason is simple: because it just does not work. But military leaders, he says, cling to it because they feel it helps Russia create a reserve for mobilization, in the event of war.

The draftee “spends a year on completely pointless military preparation,” Felgenhauer says, “which he will never again need, and at the same time he is not working, he is not adding economic value to the economy... Military bosses want to preserve the draft simply so that they don’t have to give it up.”

Time, technology, and economics are not on the bosses’ side.

The opportunity costs and direct costs of equipping, training, and housing forces that muster out in just 12 months will only continue to rise and be a drag on the economy. Warfare is also becoming increasingly dependent on technological capabilities and less on manpower. Size matters less than technical prowess, and the army and navy will find it increasingly more “profitable” to put their resources into highly-trained professionals rather than underage recruits.

An important change to this year’s draft may signal that the bosses are getting the message: educational deferments have been restored for students at technical colleges (previously, they would be called up at age 20, now they can finish their courses). The military clearly sees the advantage of recruits arriving pre-trained in technical professions.

On the flip side, another important change this year is that young men in Crimea, annexed by Russia in 2014, are now subject to the draft.

One step forward...