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Despite a flood of analyses inside and outside Russia, there has yet to be an adequate explanation for Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s surprise announcement this weekend, dismissing Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko and re-appointing in his place Victor Chernomyrdin. Interestingly, most analyses have sought to apply logic and reason to their explanations. Yet, as seasoned observers know, such concepts tend to be useless when analyzing Russia in general and Boris Yeltsin in particular.

The most “aktualny” question in Russia today, two days after Yeltsin’s dismissal of Kirienko (nicknamed in the press “kinder-surprise,” after a popular candy here), is whether Yeltsin can be an “adequate” president for Russia for the next 18 months. At the very least, his erratic behavior is swelling the ranks of  those calling for his dismissal.

I recall a conversation I had at the time of Yeltsin’s quintupal bypass operation with an authoritative psychotherapist and neurologist. He cited the example of a client of his who complained that her husband had become an unpredictable and scary tyrant after his bypass operation. But back then I did not take the message to heart. After all, Yeltsin had not been particularly rational in his behavior prior to the operation -- for one, he has fired and rehired reformer Anatoly Chubais almost as often as George Steinbrenner toyed with Billy Martin.

But the irrationality reached new heights when, five months ago, Yeltsin fired Viktor Chernomyrdin (who had been prime minister for five years) and put in his place a very inexperienced, young reformer. No one bought the official explanation, that Yeltsin sought to pump new blood into the government and allow Chernomyrdin a chance to get ready for the 2000 election. The most logical explanation, oft-cited in the media, was that Yeltsin saw Chernomyrdin as a political threat. True enough, Yeltsin’s former press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov once said that Yeltsin truly loves only one thing: power. It is his mistress, Kostikov said.

And now, Chernomyrdin is back. Which, in a logical world, tells us that the power-monger thesis is incorrect.

This leaves just two explanations for this week’s events: (1) Yeltsin truly is unstable and inadequate to govern the world’s largest country; (2) there is more here than meets the eye.

If  (1) is true, then speculation can end here and impeachment is the only wise course of action. And yet... and yet, even if (1) were true, we cannot overlook the cold-blooded and calculating retinue surrounding the president. Here is meant not merely the wunderkind Chubais, but first and foremost those who have always worked in the shadows -- his first circle -- Valentin Yumashev, Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana Dyachenko and Boris Berezovsky. All are political chess players par excellence, who have repeatedly shown themselves capable of playing several moves ahead of their opponents. Which leads us to explanation (2). And here the pieces begin to fall into place.

For, by firing Chernomyrdin and then calling him back just 154 days later (calling Kirienko "a used-up Tupolev-154," in reference to Russia’s most dangerous airplane), Yeltsin killed many a bird with one stone -- or rather with the stroke of plume.

First, Yeltsin gave the West, the IMF in particular, a serious warning. “You wanted expeditious reforms, quicker results in tax collection, etc.” Yeltsin could be saying. “I appointed the young, Western-style, reform-oriented Kirienko and see what happened? Now you have the Scylla and Charibdis in one package: a devalued ruble, a 90-day default on foreign debt, plus a farewell to high-yield T-bills. Is it what you really wanted?”

Kirienko's seemingly justified yet spectacular moves -- from his arresting of Gazprom accounts to the latest ruble devaluation and default -- did nothing but raise havoc with investors and business partners, sending shivers through the spines of brokers in every world market. One year ago, Russia had the hottest stock market in the world. Now it is the coldest. Yeltsin has deputized Chernomyrdin to meet Gore and Clinton at the airport next week. One can surmise that the latter will embrace the re-new premier and let out a sigh of relief.

Second, Yeltsin has achieved a masterful shifting of blame. Let us suppose that Yeltsin or his retinue knew about the imminent collapse of the Russian economy, in which case the Kirienko interlude was really all about finding a whipping boy. After all, even last spring, Russia’s economic woes were known to all, for Chernomyrdin himself was the chief architect of this house of cards. It was Chernomyrdin who established and defended the artificially high ruble rate; Chernomyrdin (through Chubais) presided over the sell-off of state assets at bargain basement prices; Chernomyrdin concocted the T-bill scheme -- now compared to the infamous MMM-style pyramid -- to pay off long-term debt with high-interest shorter term T-Bills; Chernomyrdin allowed the mushrooming of inter-enterprise debt and ungodly wage arrears. In short, at the time of Chernomyrdin’s dismissal, the economy’s underlying problems were well-known and their effects oft-predicted. It is conceivable that Boris Nikolaevich and Victor Stepanovich saw the oncoming train and decided to appoint a new engineer to handle the collision part. And Kirienko is playing his part well (apparently the golden parachute of a bank presidency may await him). “We are just entering the crisis,” he said, “and the crisis needs to be blamed on somebody.”

This is not to say Russia is out of the woods. Chernomyrdin will certainly have to put in place further unpopular measures -- but he can blame it all on his predecessor. Actually his first Tuesday here proved a black one - on August 25 the ruble fell by 10 % down to R7,86 per dollar the worst such fall since the black TUesday in 1994. And on August 26 the trade at MICEX was called invalid as the ruble exceeded the R8/$1 threshold.

After all, whom were rank-and-file votes recriminating against as they were panicking and lining up for dollars? Kirienko. For some time at least, Chernomyrdin can blame bad news on the Tupolev-154.

Third, these moves may have helped Yeltsin allies make some money on the stock market crash. Let us recall that Kirienko was to tell the world about the GKO and OFZ T-Bill restructuring on Monday, August 24. But he was dismissed on the eve of the announcement. Now Chernomyrdin will measure seven times before cutting a deal with holders of state securities. Coincidentally -- or not -- right after Chernomyrdin was appointed acting premier, Gazprom stocks (with which Viktor Stepanovich is not altogether unfamiliar) rose in value by 24%.  What if Chernomyrdin's government disavows Kirienko’s brash statements about the death of the stock market? Even if it were a short-term bluff, think of the scale of the speculation. Think of those in the know who never dumped in panic any stock of, say, Gazprom, or of those who bought some for next to nothing as the brokers were panicking?

Finally, the machiavellian machinations could be seen as helping Yeltsin secure the previously tenuous path of succession (and answer the question of whether he would run again for president). Those who feared for the president’s health and saw Kirienko as an undesireable replacement in the event of Yeltsin’s incapacity are breathing a sigh of relief that a “heavyweight” is back in the co-pilot’s seat, even if he is not their heavyweight.

This is cemented by Yeltsin’s explicit anointing of Chernomyrdin as his successor in 2000. True, it remains to be seen whether Chernomyrdin will keep his seat through the year 2000, let alone take over as president (after all, the “nod” from Yeltsin can also be interpreted as the kiss of death, given Yeltsin’s almost non-existent approval ratings). But now the masks are down so to speak. And it will be extremely hard for Yeltsin to say again in a few months, that, "guided by the supreme interests of Russia" he will run for president again in 2000. Of course, nothing is excluded from possibility. But in all likelihood Yeltsin is now preocupied with the same thought as his upcoming visitor, Bill Clinton: his place in history.

But then again, this is Russia and this is Yeltsin. Deducing machiavellian schemes like this, as intriguing as it may be, probably gives Yeltsin too much credit. In all likelihood, Yeltsin simply resorted five months ago and again this weekend to his favorite Napoleanic tactics: “we engage in the battle, and then we’ll see.”

In which case one cannot help wondering, on the eve of the 184th anniversary of the Battle of Borodino, whether Russia has outgrown such tactics and whether it might be time to find a suitable Kutuzov for herself as Russia's new savior, and maybe just in case an Elba for a president who has served us well but just a bit too long.

-- Mikhail Ivanov