Chechnya: A Gordian Knot

Among Moscow’s political elite, and indeed amongst Russian society as a whole, there seem to be few who believe that the Chechen conflict can ever be resolved, much less in the near future.

And while it would be wrong to conclude from this that the Kremlin has given up on Chechnya, it is not clear what the Powers That Be plan to do about it.

Over a year ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin set out on a course of “Chechenization” – transforming the conflict from one between Moscow and Chechnya into one that pitted Chechens against one another. Akhmad Kadyrov was elected president of Chechnya and given wide-ranging powers. The republic was given billions of rubles to revive the economy and social sector. Federal forces were to remain in Chechnya to assist Kadyrov’s government in its fight against the rebels.

Then 80 percent of the cash sent for Chechnya’s reconstruction was embezzled (Kadyrov himself admitted this); the war and terrorist attacks never ended; and the Chechen president, who, incidentally, did not enjoy overwhelming public support, was assassinated in May 2004 in a blast at a Grozny stadium.

Kadyrov’s elected (in fact, appointed) successor, Alu Alkhanov, appears to be an interim figure. Behind his back looms the assassinated president’s son. Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechnya’s first deputy prime minister and chief of the republic’s presidential security service, is an ambitious young man, quite outspoken about Chechnya’s economic autonomy, about creating an offshore zone, and about taking full control of the republic’s oil.

Kadyrov seems to consider himself Putin’s “partner” – that he has a right to dictate terms. So the Russian president will have to educate the young man, to make sure that Kadyrov does not exceed the role he has been assigned. Or Putin could try to do without Kadyrov. But that might anger the powerful Kadyrov clan and exacerbate the situation.

Yet the Kadyrov question is not the only difficult piece in the Chechen puzzle. Military actions are still raging in the rebel republic and peace is nowhere in the horizon.

It is axiomatic that force is not an answer.  Yet, talks with separatists are also not an option. First, they would be a fiasco for Putin’s policy in Chechnya. Second, the Kremlin cannot talk to the warlord Shamil Basayev, and without this, any dialogue with separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov will be useless. Third, Moscow will never agree to discuss Chechen independence, and Maskhadov, who is constantly reported to be “on the verge of being captured,” will never surrender.

Even if we suppose the impossible, that talks are begun with moderate elements and yield some kind of positive results, the extremists will still be there, continuing their Wahhabite cause. In fact, the Kadyrov clan would surely shun any talks with Maskhadov, fearful that the result might be sharing power with “moderate” rebels.

Some liberal politicians in Moscow suggest that Western middlemen and maybe even an international peacekeeping force in Chechnya could help resolve the conflict. But this is impossible. Moscow would never assent to foreign involvement in its domestic affairs. For Putin, this would be not just a sign of a weakness, but tantamount to political humiliation, something he would never allow. Everyone knows the Caucasus has little respect for the weak. Outside interference in the region might actually stir up separatist spirit in the other republics.

Meanwhile, one cannot help feeling that, while the Kremlin tries to untie the Chechen knot, it is also using Chechnya as leverage over domestic and foreign policy.

Both in 1994 and in 1999 (the starts of the first and second Chechen offensives), the Russian political elite cherished the idea of a “small victorious war” as a way, in 1994, to bolster then President’s Boris Yeltsin’s authority, and then, in 1999, to help Vladimir Putin become president.

What is more, the Kremlin clearly considers the war in Chechnya and the terrorist attacks that accompany it a valid pretext for tightening the screws on dissent within the country. Thus, in September, in the wake of the Beslan terrorist attack which claimed hundreds of hostages’ lives, President Putin justified his proposal for canceling the direct election of governors (among other measures) as part and parcel of the anti-terrorist agenda.

Meanwhile, in foreign policy, the fight against terrorism in Chechnya is seen to be a good way to demonstrate Russia’s important role in the international anti-terrorist coalition. (Although, as the European Council Secretary General Terry Davis said, the Chechen conflict and the fight against terrorism should be discussed separately, but in parallel).

As for Russian society, it has become increasingly indifferent about Chechnya. In September, some 70 percent of Russians said they were in favor of some form of separation of Chechnya from Russia; only 22 percent were against this. The fact that this poll was taken after Beslan cannot be discounted. Yet even prior to the school siege tragedy, over half of Russians were ready to let Chechnya go (Only in 1999, when the war seemed to be going the Kremlin’s way, did 62.5 percent of Russians poll in favor of Chechnya remaining within Russia).

All of this demonstrates that Putin’s ratings have little to do with the course of the war in Chechnya. Or with terrorist attacks. After the Beslan tragedy, Putin’s approval rating fell, but still held at 66 percent (it was lowest after the sinking of the Kursk, at 60 percent).

So, will Putin alter his cherished policy of “Chechenization”?

It might make sense to stop pinning hopes on a single leader for Chechnya. If fair elections were held for the Chechen parliament, it would show who among local politicians enjoys the greatest public support. Then some kind of a governing council could be established, which would elect a chairman.

Of course, this would not bring about an immediate resolution of the conflict. Separatists will probably continue their resistance for years to come. Especially since many are not eligible for any kind of amnesty – it is not just Chechens, but other Caucasian nationalities that are fighting in the mountains. On the other hand, an internal accord amongst non-militant sectors of society would give those who cherish the idea of an Islamic state some food for thought. Mujahideen in the mountains are, after all, worn out from years of fighting.

Yes, the Kremlin could risk a continuation of Chechenization, accompanied by a dead end war and the slow and ever-reversible reconstruction of the derelict republic. Yet a policy of “neither peace nor war” will end up hanging (indeed, it already hangs) over the Northern Caucasus like the Sword of Damocles, threatening destabilization of all Southern Russia. And this is something that neither society nor the Powers That Be can afford, if only because it is a matter of survival.   RL