Moscow Knights

German General Headquarters had worked out their plan for the final offensive on Moscow during their successful battle near Kiev, in late September 1941. Dubbed “Typhoon,” the operation was to include 77 army divisions, including 8 motorized and 14 tank divisions, which would sweep through Soviet defenses like a typhoon, the seemingly unstoppable German forces taking Moscow before winter set in. To prepare the offensive against the Russian capital, the Germans unfolded their forces from Kursk in the South to Kalinin in the North. They faced the defense of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts under the respective commanders Ivan Konev, Semyon Budyonny and Alexander Yeremenko.

A month earlier, during the hubris of the early successes of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler had told Goebels that Moscow will be “erased from the face of the earth as the center of Bolshevik resistance.” Special equipment was being prepared to inundate the city and create a gigantic lake on its site. From among the 4th German Army a “special team” within the Einzatsgruppen SS “B” was to become the police force of Moscow and take control of a fallen Moscow. Several German units had already been distributed special uniforms for a future parade in the Russian capital (notably, however, just one-third of German forces had clothing for winter, as the high command expected the war to be over by then and two-thirds of the German army to be returned to the rear).

German intelligence on Russian capabilities was virtually non-existent prior to the war. And Hitler, overconfident from his easy victory in France, brooked no doubts about German invincibility. When Croatian Defense Minister Kvaternik asserted that the USSR could create new divisions behind the Urals, the Führer just laughed.

Even the USSR’s new allies were confident of its imminent collapse. US Naval Secretary Frank Knox estimated that the Soviet Union would crumble in 6-8 weeks. The head of the British General Staff said that “the Soviet armies will be herded like cattle.” Only Franklin Roosevelt continued to believe that the USSR would take the heat and withstand the challenge.

Why did the Nazis choose to march on Moscow? After all, for Hitler, the main operational objectives for attacking the Soviet Union were to gain control of the fertile Ukraine and access the Caucasian oilfields. As late as July 1941, Hitler relegated the capture of Moscow to secondary importance, after Leningrad and Ukraine. Moscow, he said, “is merely a mark on a map.”

His senior commanders did not agree. General of the Tank Corps Guderian summarized their views when he stressed that “Moscow is not only the head and heart of the Soviet Union. It is also a communication center, a political center, the most industrialized region and a major transportation center. Stalin knows it. He knows that the Moscow variant means a definite defeat. He will thus concentrate all his forces near Moscow. If we win a victory in Moscow and thus turn off the central switching station of the Soviet Union, then its other regions will also fall before us.”

But Hitler would not be swayed. On August 24, fully a month after the swift victories in Minsk and Smolensk, with his troops just 200 miles from Moscow at the height of summer, the Führer opted to split the bulk of his forces, simultaneously attacking north toward Leningrad and south toward Ukraine. It would be October before these forces, now even more over-extended, would regroup with Army Group Center and turn their attention on the capital. And by that time, winter was fast closing in.

Meanwhile, in July, the Soviet State Committee of Defense (GKO) ordered that the main line of defense form at Mozhaisk (110 km west of Moscow). It was to consist of three armies headed by the commander of the Moscow Military Region, General-Lieutenant Artemiev. By the end of July, three echelons of forces had been regrouped for the defense of Moscow: the Western Front, the Front of Armies in Reserve and the Front of the Mozhaisk Line of Defense. Interestingly, some of the first significant military actions were to unfold not far from the Borodino field where 129 years ago the Russians fought Napoleon.

Meanwhile, long anti-tank ditches (stretching over 200 miles on the northern approaches and 160 miles in the West and South, in addition to four semi-circular lines around Moscow) were beefed up with minefields and barricades, largely through the efforts of the 250,000 civilian residents of Moscow and its environs.

In late August, Zhukov threw the two armies from the left flank of the Reserve Front into a counter-offensive near the town of Yelnya. This helped to disrupt German organization of the impending attack, liquidating the so-called Yelnya ledge, which the Germans had intended to exploit to breakthrough to Moscow. It was the first piece of land in Europe (150-200 km2) won back from the Wehrmacht. Similar types of counterattacks were launched to the South, unfortunately to little effect.

By late September, German forces at Army Center had been reinforced with reserves and with forces from other fronts. The total center group of armies now numbered 1.8 million soldiers, 1,700 tanks and 1,390 aircraft. This represented a 1.4-2 fold numerical superiority over the Red Army and was the greatest concentration of German forces ever seen. There were more tank and motorized divisions than those Germany lined up in May 1940 against France, Belgium and the Netherlands put together. Over the 203 days of the Battle for Moscow, considering reinforcements, some 7,035,000 soldiers took part on both sides.

Historians divide the Battle for Moscow into two periods: the defensive (September 3 to December 4, 1941) and the offensive (December 5, 1941 to April 20, 1942). Several units of German troops began the assault on Moscow as early as September 26. But the main attack was to be unleashed on October 3. On the night of October 2, the soldiers of the Eastern Front were read Hitler’s address. He told the troops that this was “the last great decisive battle of the year.” The next day, Hitler announced to the German people that “not before then was he permitted to tell the German people that the foe was already broken and would never rise again.”

At dawn on October 3, the main German forces headed east. Employing the by now standard tank-led pincer movement that had encircled Smolensk, Kiev and other cities, German forces pierced Russian defenses in three locations along the front, each separated by some 150-200 km. Within ten days German forces were in Khimki, northwest of Moscow, had encircled Soviets troops near Vyazma (creating the so-called “Bryansk kotyol”— “pot”) and had broken through to Kalinin from the Southwest. There was now a 500 km wide gap in the Western Front. The road to Moscow stood open to German tanks, just 40 km from the outskirts.

It was a desperate situation and, for Stalin, it called for desperate measures. In July, Stalin had dismissed General Georgy Zhukov as Chief of the General Staff in favor of the hapless Shaposhnikov. Since that time, Zhukov had been coordinating the Reserve Forces and the defense of Leningrad. Without admitting his error, Stalin on October 10 appointed Zhukov Commander of the Western Front, saying by telephone, “take everything in your hands and act.”

Intelligence from Japan, provided by Richard Zorge, indicated that Japan would not join the war against Russia, but was preparing for an attack on the US. This allowed crucial reinforcement of the western front with “Siberian Divisions” from the Far East, many of them top class marksmen and all well-equipped for winter warfare.

That Hitler’s forces were able to come so close to Moscow is largely attributable to Soviet military command’s complacency and inability to correctly anticipate German actions. Forces were spread too thin along the front lines and did not correlate with enemy forces. For instance, where the 9th German army broke through Soviet lines, Soviet forces had just 19 tanks against Germany’s 591. At the same time, on other, less crucial sectors of the front, a useless balance in Russia’s favor was found. Throw in the manifest German superiority in aviation and artillery and it is no surprise that two-thirds of Russian divisions ended up encircled.

The State Defense Committee (GKO) evacuated from Moscow industrial enterprises, state agencies and most of the city’s population, having declared the capital under siege. As many as 1,119 sites were prepared for destruction. The most important state establishments and the diplomatic corps were evacuated to Kuybyshev (modern day Samara). A Special Brigade subordinated to the chief of the 4th Diversionary Directorate of the NKVD, General Pavel Sudoplatov, mined buildings which might serve as offices for the Wehrmacht command, should Moscow be occupied. The brigade also mined several government dachas near Moscow, excepting Stalin’s dacha.

According to numerous memoirs and documents now available, Stalin had in fact envisaged that Moscow could be sacrificed. The Resolution of October 15, 1941, on the evacuation of the capital, testifies that the Supreme Commander (Stalin) was also supposed to leave the capital. On the night of October 15-16, the order was given to evacuate part of the city’s population, and to distribute food products from stores to residents. When measures began being implemented, there were cases of disorder on the streets, but these were quickly stopped. Yet, on October 16, cases of panic during mass evacuation had to be quelled again.

On the whole however, Muscovites were quite stoic in the face of difficult odds. Entire divisions of people’s militia were formed in Moscow. As many as 440,000 Muscovites built barriers, anti-tank moats and metallic barricades from rails. As Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov recalled, the artillery from several warships was put on wheels and sent to Moscow, 25 naval brigades arrived near the Russian capital. In no time the city was turned into a fortress.

On November 6, 1941, on the eve of the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin called upon his compatriots to wage a patriotic war. Despite the tense situation, on November 7, 1941 troops were found to parade on the Red Square and right after the parade went to the front (all artillery was on the front lines, however, and relics from military museums had to be used in the demonstration).

The Typhoon was losing wind at the Mozhaisk line of defense, and, for the first time, German command was realizing that it was in a dire situation. Vastly overextended, facing serious equipment breakdowns and supply problems, the Wehrmacht was finally realizing that it faced a formidable enemy in Russia, which had a much stronger rear than anticipated and which was the first foe yet capable of grinding the blitzkrieg to a halt. And then there was winter, which was coming early in 1941. German equipment was not oiled or prepared for the subfreezing climes; there were insufficient winter uniforms for troops and supply lines were further fractured by cold weather.

Yet, on November 11, notwithstanding the diminished potential of his troops, Hitler signed an order for a new offensive against Moscow—given the over-stressed condition of his troops, it would later be called Germany’s “retreat to the East.” The offensive was launched on November 15, its intent being the encirclement and blockade of the capital. Initially, there were successes. By November 23, German tanks were in Klin and winding around the capital to the North.

In his book Reminiscences and Thoughts, Zhukov wrote about a phone conversation he had with Stalin during the November offensive:

Stalin: “Are you sure we will retain Moscow? I am asking you with pain in my soul. Answer me honestly, like a communist.”

Zhukov: “We will no doubt retain Moscow. But then we need no less than two armies and at least 200 tanks,” Zhukov answered.

Stalin: “It’s not bad you have such assurance. Call the General Staff and ask where to focus the two reserve armies you are asking for. They will be ready by late November. But we cannot give you tanks for now.”

Stalin had reason to be worried, for it seemed initially that the German offensive would be successful. In early December, just 12 km separated the Germans from the borders of modern Moscow in the Lianozovo district. From the roofs of houses in the villages Katyushki, Puchki and Krasnaya Polyana, German soldiers could peer into Moscow streets through binoculars. The atmosphere in the Soviet government was extremely tense: Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, the top Soviet leader after Stalin, threatened to shoot Zhukov. Zhukov, in turn, threatened to shoot commander Konstantin Rokosovsky for any non-ordered withdrawal of troops.

But Russian soldiers continued to fight. Cases of mass heroism were legion. For example, in the Northwest, where the situation was especially dangerous, near the crossroads of Dubosekovo village, the now famous 28 Panfilovtsy (i.e. soldiers commanded by General Ivan Panfilov) fought to the last man for four hours, stopping 18 enemy tanks and killing many German soldiers. It was there that the politruk (political leader) Vasily Klochkov pronounced his now famous phrase: “Russia is huge, but there is nowhere to retreat to, for Moscow is behind us!”

Meanwhile, behind German lines throughout the Moscow region, partisans were decimating the German forces from the rear. As a result, the Germans were especially merciless to partisan prisoners. On November 28, 1941 they caught one such hero—18-year old student Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya—in the village of Petrishchevo outside Moscow, as she tried to set fire to an izba where Germans were lodged. Zoya was tortured by her captors but never revealed the names of her comrades. Aghast at her stubbornness, the Germans raped her and hanged her in front of the whole village. But rather than deter others, it only spurred further acts of heroism.

The Germans were finally stopped on December 3. On the night of December 5-6, the long-awaited Soviet counter-offensive was launched at Moscow. Simultaneously, the Stavka ordered an offensive in Tikhvin, near Leningrad, and at Rostov-on-the-Don, to keep the Germans from diverting troops from the South or North to Moscow.

This transition to a counter-offensive without any pause took the Germans by surprise. What is more, the scale of the action was unprecedented, with three Soviet armies on the offensive along a 1000 kilometer front.

The date of the counter-offensive was significant: according to the Orthodox Church calendar, December 5 was the date that Prince Alexander Nevsky defeated the Teutonic (German) knights on Chudskoye Lake in 1142.

Historians have meticulously calculated the correlation of forces on the eve of the Soviet counter-offensive. The Red Army had 1,100,000 soldiers, 7,652 guns and mortars, 415 reactive “Katyusha” artillery rockets, 774 tanks and 1,000 aircraft. The German Center Army Group had 1,708,000 men, 13,500 guns and mortars, 1,170 tanks and 615 aircraft. Yet, notwithstanding their numerical superiority, the Germans were beaten back. The Soviet army liberated Kalinin, Klin and Solnechnogorsk. Their breakthrough to Rzhev posed a threat to the armies from the North. In the South, Kaluga and Naro-Fominsk were freed. By January 7, 1942, German forces had been pushed back by some 100-250 km and suffered incredible losses. The threat of Moscow’s sack was eliminated.

The Wehrmacht’s top commanders paid dearly for the defeat, even though the strategy had been entirely of Hitler’s making. On December 19, 1941 Fieldmarshal von Bock, commander of the Center Army Group, lost his position. On December 26, 1941, commander of the 2nd Tank Army, General Guderian was dismisssed. In all, Hitler ordered the purge of 177 generals because of the “debacle” near Moscow.

During the most critical moment of the German retreat, General von Bock noted in his diary three reasons for the German defeat at Moscow: “poor roads caused by autumn weather, which impeded maneuverability, paralysis of railroads, and the underestimation of the forces and reserves of the adversary.”

In fact, the lattermost reason was decisive. As von Bock wrote in his diary, the adversary, “with its inexhaustible human forces, without sparing it, is switching to the counter-offensive.” True enough, Soviet generals did not always spare their soldiers. But then the “zero dead” doctrine was not applicable in those times and extreme circumstances. Russians were fiercely defending the heart of their country at all costs. As a result, again according to von Bock, “in an amazingly short period of time, the Russians could reassemble destroyed divisions.”

Hitler was so sure of victory in the East that he did not anticipate a winter campaign. He calculated that surprise and his cruel, ferocious fashion of waging war would break the country’s will to resist. But the tactic which paid off in Europe failed against a people whose will was forged by many centuries of trials and tribulations.

At Moscow, Germany suffered its first major defeat in WWII and was no longer considered invincible. The blitzkrieg’s epitaph was also written, and Hitler could never again marshal the forces for a large-scale surprise attack. In the future, Germany was forced to introduce a system of total mobilization of human and material resources.

Fieldmarshal Keitel (who in May 1945 would sign the act of surrender on behalf of Germany) acknowledged that, after the Battle for Moscow, he could no longer envision a military solution to the campaign in the East. Germany was henceforth faced with a truly People’s War. From both sides of the Atlantic, there was a growing awareness that the Moscow battle saved the Free World from the fascist yoke. The confidence of the Axis Powers was also sapped: Japan relinquished its “Northern Variant” and didn’t attack the USSR. Turkey also refrained from siding with Germany. The Germans gave up their plans of invading India and the Middle East. Franklin Roosevelt told Stalin about the “overwhelming enthusiasm which swept the people and the country because of the encouraging successes of the Red Army.” In mid-December 1941, Winston Churchill wrote to his Chief of Staff that “the main factors in the war now are the defeats and losses of Hitler in Russia.”

Indeed, the victory of the USSR in the Battle for Moscow played a decisive role in the creation of the anti-Hitler coalition. Before the USSR proved itself near Moscow against Hitler, its allies, potential and real, were taking a wait and see position. The USSR was waging the war against Hitler alone. The lend-lease shipments and the opening of the Second Front were still in the future.

A million Muscovites were decorated with the medal “For the Defense of Moscow.” Paradoxically, Georgy Zhukov was not awarded one of these medals. To fathom this injustice, one merely needs to consider the “court psychology” in Stalin’s retinue: if the merits of the front commander were highly appreciated, then the contribution of Stalin would surely be diminished.

Zhukov, for his part, led Soviet forces all the way to the seizure of Berlin and the storming of the Reichstag. Yet in his memoirs he stated the matter quite simply: “When I am asked what I remembered best from the past war, I answer, ‘the Battle for Moscow.’”  RL

Cut the phrases on valor and bravery

Words are just words

We stood here making no step backward

We are laying here. But then Moscow stands tall.

— Poet Vladimir Karpeko

Nikolai Poroskov, a retired colonel, worked for many years at Krasnaya Zvezda, the daily military newspaper. He is now military observer with the weekly Vek. His story on the Russian cavalry regiment was published in Russian Life’s February 1997 issue.