The Moscow Summit

Last fall, in the aftermath of the September 11 bombings and just prior to the US-Russian summit in the US, Russian Life Executive Editor Mikhail Ivanov spoke with Georg`y Bovt, deputy editor-in-chief at the authoritative daily newspaper, Izvestia (Russian Life, Nov/Dec 2001). As a seasoned and respected “Amerikanist,” he offered a well-informed and realistic perspective that many readers told us they appreciated. We therefore thought that a “sequel” interview with Bovt on the eve of the May summit in Moscow might offer an excellent opportunity to revisit our previous discussion and look even further into the future.

Russian Life: It is always interesting to take a look at what happened after one has made a prediction and see how well it fit with reality. Last time we talked (Russian Life, Nov/Dec 2001) was shortly after September 11, in the run-up to the Texas summit. We anticipated that the two leaders might at least establish the same kind of rapport that President Bush has with, say, British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Did they succeed in this?

Georgy Bovt: Yes, in Texas the two leaders managed to establish a good rapport, to the extent it was possible, of course, for both Bush and Putin are rather private, reserved persons. I mean, even now it is not likely they would go to a banya together. But if, say, Putin played golf—we know he prefers skiing—I feel they would play golf together. 

RL: Did I get you right, that this “private character in their personalities” in fact contributed to a rapprochement between the two presidents?

GB: Well, yes. Not only are they both reserved and private, but they are both sufficiently religious and conservative; they both love their countries and wish their own countries well.

RL: If I may, I would like to review the thoughts we had before Texas, informed by the tragic events of September 11 in New York. Namely, we discussed whether America might no longer need Russia once Russia had served its purpose in America’s war against Bin Laden and world terrorism. Now that the Taliban is decimated … it seems that this caution was justified. I mean, shortly after Texas a whole range of things happened which one way or another affected our bilateral relations, and which many in Russia saw as detrimental to these relations, if not an overt attempt to humiliate Russia. And here I am speaking of, for --example, the Olympics, the tariffs imposed on Russian exports of steel to the US, and US pressure on Russia to lift a ban on US chicken, which our veterinary services said does not meet Russian sanitary norms.

GB: And what about the Salt Lake City Olympics?! Do you mean the Americans were supposed to lose to us in ice hockey, or what? No, they couldn’t do that.

RL: Of course not. I mean that many in Russia thought—and wrote—that the US seized on these Olympics as an opportunity to restore American greatness in the world, to help America feel good about itself. Thus, there was an effort to make the US win as many gold medals as possible, taking away medals from Russians in the process. So they say. The criticism reached its peak with Irina Slutskaya, who clearly deserved a gold in women’s single skating, especially after Michelle Kwan fell. But no, there was a “back-up champion, Sarah Hughes,” whom some said the judges gave the gold by yanking her to the top, up from 4th place [before the final program] ... 

GB: I don’t know really. I watched this women’s ice skating competition and I liked the skating of Hughes better than Slutskaya, who made some small errors. But that’s my personal opinion. Now, about the US’ attempt to restore its greatness at the expense of others. The thing is, they could not care less about us in America. They do what they do for themselves. The fact is that we in Russia need to stop doing things simply vopreki [against] or to spite someone else. If we want our athletes to perform better, let’s do it just for our own sake, for us, not to spite someone. Because, if Americans are doing something, they are doing it for themselves in the first place ... If they want to feel great about themselves—it’s for their own sake. They sang that song at the opening ceremony, and we thought: ‘See, this is something against us.’ No. 

As regards us being their strategic partners and all that, well, we need to admit to ourselves that, for now, our power is not equal. We need to stop thinking like a superpower. Economically at least, we have stopped being one. In terms of GDP, we are at best in the world’s top 20 or something like that, so... 

RL: Now the “chicken war.” I mean, the ban on import of US chicken which Russia imposed in early March.

GB: It’s clear that, despite official Russian statements to the contrary, this was done in retaliation for the US’ protectionist measures imposed on imports of Russian steel. Actually, these US restrictions were not as drastic as they sounded. And, while there are restrictions on some types of steel, Russian steel makers can in fact increase imports of other types of rolled steel, but then these are just technical details. As to US chicken, for now, prices for US chicken would be lower than for our own, domestic chicken, so let them compete with US chicken, that is all.

RL: But our farming officials and poultry producers say we are quite capable of satisfying domestic demand for chicken meat on our own, without US imports. None other than former advertising tycoon Sergei Lisovsky—now a chicken expert—promised to fill in the gap with his birds. Frankly, as a consumer, I feel our chicken is tastier, more natural. 

GB: Here again, we need to stop thinking in terms of doing something “against someone,” or to spite someone. If we want to develop our own poultry industry further, let’s do it. But just for our own sake, not against someone. And, actually, competition can only be good for our chicken producers. As to Bush’s restriction on Russian steel, I feel that, in the short term, he did right by his steelmakers, and he scored points in congress and with the electorate. But, in the long term, he did his steelmakers a disservice, because an absence of competition leads to further stagnation. It is simply that US-made steel is not competitive. Not even versus Russian steel, but also versus European-made steel. This is because labor costs are much higher in the US. And our Russian steel, even with these restrictions, can successfully compete with US steel. Those restrictions actually were not so lethal; we can still beat US steel. So, if Bush wants to keep protecting his steelmakers to the detriment of that industry, fine. As regards the ban on chicken, I feel it will just expire after its term [60 days]. That is all. 

RL: Won’t the two leaders be tempted to sign something on this in Moscow in late May, to show some type of tangible results?

GB: No, I think the chicken ban will end earlier. 

RL: To wind up the list of “sticky” issues in our relations: the eyebrows of many Russian officials were raised by this “secret” Pentagon report published by the Los Angeles Times. I mean the report which said that Russia is one of the seven potential nuclear targets for the US. Russians felt it was unfair treatment of a new American friend; our top officials asked for clarifications.

GB: Oh, well. Let me fire the question back at you. And what do our nuclear missiles target? Burkina Faso?

RL: Got you. OK, now let’s try to figure out what we can expect from the upcoming US-Russia summit in Moscow and what place it may take in the annals of bilateral summits held in Moscow in the past. There was the Gorbachev-Reagan summit in 1988, George Bush, Sr. came here in 1990 ... But here I am thinking in the first place of the 1972 summit in Moscow, when Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed the ABM treaty, which ironically ...

GB: Yes, which is going to formally cease to exist shortly after Putin and Bush meet in Moscow ...

RL: So what should we expect from this Moscow summit?

GB: I think they will reach an agreement on further cuts in strategic arms. But, most importantly, I expect them to sign a joint declaration which has specific details on the strategy of the further development of our [bilateral] relations, based on common concerns over international threats and the dangers both of our countries face. Like how to jointly deal with terrorism, with the proliferation of nuclear weapons ...

RL: Anything more durable and peaceful, like in the field of economics? We both know Americans are pragmatists, so can we figure out what they need from us, so that we can find some common ground …

GB: In general terms, the main thing they want from Russia for now is that this huge country maintain control over its nuclear and other arsenals, so that the world and American security are not threatened. Like I said, economically, Russia is unfortunately not capable of talking to the US as an equal. As to US investment to Russia, it hardly exceeds $2 billion, and much of this money comes from offshore. When you look at US-China relations, there, yes, Americans will keep arguing with the Chinese on many political issues—like human rights, arms, etc.—but then there is also a huge block of economic issues to talk about, simply because China long ago created the right climate for US investors. True, there is cooperation in space, where Russia still has something left to offer, but other than that ...

RL: As a Russian, don’t you feel a bit sorry about all of what you have said—that we can’t speak on equal terms anymore and all that?

GB: Of course I do. But what we need to do is to make a set of priorities for our country. And in this I don’t see much consensus among our Powers That Be. For example, some top advisers say we need to join the WTO, others say we don’t need to. We need to set concrete goals and concrete milestones. For example, do we intend to enter NATO in the future, or will we never be a part of it? Do we want NATO to become an international peacekeeping organization and does Russia want to be part of it—at least its political component—or not? Are we going to enter the European Community, or will Russia perhaps create some sort of Asian-European Economic Community? 

Ukraine, for instance, proclaimed a concrete goal—to enter the European Community by the year 2010. That’s something concrete, a guideline. And us? I am afraid it will be the same story as with these new, lower aircraft noise standards introduced in Europe—the ones that most Russian aircraft cannot meet. We knew ten years ago that these standards would be introduced. But now, two months before their introduction, our air transportation officials woke up and are trying to negotiate a postponement of these new norms vis-a-vis Russian planes. Or—economically—are we going to develop all our industries? Or are we going to focus only on the industries which are “salvageable”? Are we going to develop our car industry and keep producing cars at the Zhiguli-level? Or are we going to pinpoint specific industries?

RL: Doesn’t Putin know this? That we need to have a more clear-cut policy, including in foreign affairs? 

GB: Our president, Vladimir Vladi-mir-ovich Putin, is a 48-year old man ...

RL: ... 49 actually, he turns 50 in a few months...

GB: OK. A 49-year old, intelligent man, highly educated, who had good, professional training in a specific field and all that. He is trying to do the best he can for his country. But he is no demigod. Because below him there is a whole mass of people. 

RL: In a recent Izvestia analytical piece written on the occasion of Putin’s two years in office last March, your daily, among other things, dwelled on what Putin’s administration had achieved in foreign policy. Of these, Izvestia pointed out: “a search for new forms of interaction with NATO is under way”; “the ABM treaty is abolished”; “we see a search for new forms of cooperation with the US.” In light of what you have just said about a lack of clear-cut objectives and goals, it sounds like you feel our leadership is moving ahead with the US by trial and error, perhaps sort of improvising. If that is the case, who is the “Russian Strobe Talbot”? I mean, who is Putin’s number one, top adviser on the US? In the past, there was the influential Georgy Arbatov—reportedly the author of the concept of détente? Who is our #1 “Amerikanist” today? Whom does Putin listen to before talking to Bush? 

GB: I am an Amerikanist myself by specialization, and I can tell you there is no such single person now. But then there is also no #1 expert on China or France. Our summits, or whatever happens in our bilateral relations, are prepared by MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. As regards our think-tanks like the US-Canada Studies Institute [formerly headed by Arbatov], well, they are no longer working with the same output, level and capacity as before. First of all, it is due to a personnel drain. Their best staffers went to work either abroad, as analysts in the US, or in such think-tanks as the Carnegie Fund in Moscow. They do develop analytical reports, but they are not on staff in the Kremlin. The Kremlin doesn’t listen to them directly. To have a clear-cut understanding of what we need to do, in which direction we should go with the US, which strategic and tactical goals to set—all of it takes strong and serious analytical work, and that’s expensive. And our MID employees are typically paid something like $100-$150 per month, so ... I mean, let’s face it—you get what you pay for. You can’t invest just a little bit in a car and expect superb quality. You will get, well, a Zhiguli. The actions of the Putin administration on the foreign front do show that our top leadership is rethinking the imperial policies of the past and is trying to make Russia a normal, pragmatic state with well-understood economic interests. But here too, the majority of the political elite lags far behind this new course, holding on to many myths and “phobias” of the Cold War. This opening of a new window on the West has a chaotic character, with the absence of clear-cut understandings of the forms that our foreign policy strategy will take.

RL: What I hear from you is that Putin badly needs fresh blood in terms of staffers, including better foreign policy advisers—the ubiquitous kadry [personnel] problem. Does this mean that the resource of staffers from the “chekist/St. Petersburg” reserve has exhausted itself?

GB: Yes. We just don’t have this tradition—like in the US—when guys like Dick Cheney, with a serious business background, come to work for the government for a very decent salary, then return to business again when he is out of office. In our governmental system, people simply do not get high enough salaries. We don’t yet have such a well-developed system of personnel flow back-and-forth between private business and public service. 

RL: Didn’t we have people like Pyotr Aven [now with Alfa Bank], who worked in a state post and then went into banking, to cite just one example? 

GB: Yes, and there was Mikhail Potanin too. And, actually, for all the reservations we may have about that period when people like Chubais or Kokh were in power (let’s skip assessments and just call it a time of the “initial accumulation of capital”), that was a dynamic period, when the Powers That Be were making dynamic headway. And what Putin actually did, upon coming to power, was to “endorse” what was done before, including by the so-called -“mladorefor-matory” (“young reformers”), without any abrupt U-turns or counterrevolutions or anything like that. Frankly, if any of today’s business tycoons were to come into politics and take a public post, they wouldn’t spoil the broth. Because the staff reserve based on former counter-intelligence officers, including some of St. Petersburg origin, has been good for a period—to reconfirm and endorse what was done before. But to make new headway and new breakthroughs, including in foreign policy, one needs fresh blood.  RL