Defending One Sixth of the Earth

The month of May is a time of mixed feelings for Russian servicemen. On May 9th they celebrate one of the nation's greatest ever victories against a foreign invader, Nazi Germany, remembering the heroic deeds of their parents and grandparents. But May is also the time of the spring draft, when rife draft-dodging serves as a reminder that all is not well in today's army. Alexander Zhilin traces the ups and downs of Russia's armies, and investigates the plight of today's.

As a vast nation without natural frontiers and a very living memory of 250 years of subjugation by the Mongols, Russia has always made a strong army a top priority since Muscovy became free of the Tatar yoke in the 15th century.

The seeds of Russia's modern army were sown in 1699, when, as part of his modernizing reforms, Peter the Great created Russia's first standing army -- organized, equipped, and trained according to Western models. Two decrees, in 1699 and 1705, stated that all non-noble males were liable to conscription for life. This term was softened to twenty-five years in 1793, twenty in 1834, and twelve in 1855. Selection of recruits to fill government quotas was left to local communities, though landowners had discretion on private estates (which they often abused). As during the American Civil War, the practice of purchasing voluntary substitutes was widespread.

Universal conscription was introduced during the ÔGreat Reforms' of 1874, when all males, whatever their class, became eligible to serve, with one-quarter of each draft pool chosen by lot to serve for six or seven years.

From Peter's time onwards, Russia maintained the largest peacetime army in Europe. This was partly explained by the need of her autocratic rulers for internal security and partly by the need to surmount chronic organization and supply disadvantages with sheer force of numbers. On the eve of the First World War, Russia was able to mobilize 6,600,000 men in a few months.

The history of Russia's Imperial Army can be divided into periods of crushing victories, pyrrhic victories and humiliating defeats. Russian history enthusiasts can easily recall the triumphs of Peter the Great's Northern War against Sweden, the humiliation of Prussia in the Seven Years War, Catherine the Great's Turkish campaigns and the dismantling of Napoleon's Grand ArmŽe.

Yet nothing can erase from the history books such national disasters as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the fateful World War of 1914-17.

The Red Army: meaner and leaner

Nobody can say that the Bolsheviks didn't follow their words with deeds, either: they succeeded in forging a highly disciplined and effective fighting force that was capable of defeating the combined armies of the White Russians and numerous foreign interventionists. Most Red Army soldiers were peasants and workers, while officers were often sergeants or lieutenants from tsarist units who had gone over to the Reds.

In the midst of critical famine and economic collapse, the young Soviet government spared no resource in training, arming and feeding its army. Lenin gave the highest priority to winning the loyalty of his soldiers –a prerequisite for any regime which had set itself in defiance of the world. Hence his famous: "A revolution is worth something only if it can defend itself."

According to this early model, iron discipline was achieved through intensive political education, suppression of individuality, and fear of severe punishment. This regime was enforced by cadres of political commissars with the authority to countermand officers' orders. Anyone who grew up in the Soviet Union remembers the famous scene from the movie Chapayev, where the Civil War hero argues with his unit's commissar over who is in charge.

"Don't you know who I am? –Chapayev!!!" declared the hero.

"And I am Furmanov, your commissar," came the smug reply.

Further, the Cheka secret police had Special Departments (Osobiye Otdely) attached to the army, providing both intelligence and ideological support. Their mission was to root out counter-revolutionary plots, thoughts and ideas.

In the 1930s, these same special departments, under the guidance of the NKVD (predecessor of the KGB), helped to gut the Red Army's officer corps during Stalin's purges.

Many of those arrested represented the cream of the Russian army. As experienced officers were shot or sent to the camps, inexperienced lieutenants were quickly promoted up the chain of command to replace them.

The Great Patriotic War

The true cost of Stalin's purges became evident when Hitler invaded in 1941, throwing the Russian front lines into chaos and driving virtually to the gates of Moscow. However, the Soviets learned quickly, and managed to turn a headlong retreat into an orderly strategic withdrawal, eventually stemming the German advance and finally gaining the upper hand.

Once again, the Russians were able to mobilize tremendous human resources, as patriotic citizens rushed to defend the motherland. Volunteers dismissed for health reasons would keep turning up until they found a way to enlist. Heroism at the front, in the factories, and behind enemy lines was so commonplace that Russians came to call this conflict the Great Patriotic War.

Crucial to Soviet triumph in this effort was the emergence of a new generation of talented military leaders. Chief among these was Marshal Georgy Zhukov, whose dramatic successes placed him in the pantheon of great Russian generals, alongside the likes of Suvorov and Kutuzov. Zhukov, a veteran of the First World War who joined the Reds in 1918 and somehow managed to escape the purges, led every crucial Soviet military operation of the Second World War, including the defense of Moscow, the relief of Leningrad and the crucial armored action at Kursk. He also masterminded the Soviet advance to Berlin and was Soviet representative at the German surrender in 1945.

If the Second World War might be said to be Russia's first Ômodern' war effort, old tactics were still pivotal. Veteran and historian Yuri Alexandrov recalls how even Zhukov was known to sacrifice bodies for the sake of victory. Soviet generals would regularly throw as many soldiers as they had into an attack, just to take some hill or village by the Stavka's (Supreme Command) deadline and avoid angry phone calls from Stalin.

Renowned historian Colonel-General Dmitry Volkogonov had this to say just before his death last year:

"Without detracting from the military talent of Soviet commanders, I have to admit that victories in the Great Patriotic War were often achieved not by savoir faire, but by numbers, when in just two hours thousands of soldiers and hundreds of officers would perish."

Rise of the two party state

The high price paid by Russia to repulse the Nazis was, however, unknown to most Russians until perestroika pried open the military's archives. In fact, the army's success in that conflict carried over into the post-war period to give it unprecedented support from the government and prestige among the people. Even thugs and bandits of the time adopted an unwritten code not to set upon men in uniform.

  Having proved its importance to national security, the Army assumed a more vigorous role within the State power apparatus, enjoying every indulgence from the Party. Nor were the recent saviors of Russia shy to ask. In the post-war period, every fourth Soviet citizen worked directly or indirectly for the defense industry.

Major technical research was carried out first and foremost with an eye on military applicability. For example, cigarette factories were configured in such a way that they could be quickly converted to bullet production.

Enter perestroika

Many high-ranking commanders of the late Soviet period, including former Soviet Defense Ministers Sergei Sokolov and Dmitry Yazov, blamed Gorbachev's perestroika for the collapse of army prestige and effectiveness.

In fact, it is safe to say that the Soviet Army, like Soviet society as a whole, was already corroding from within. And lavish support from the State budget was doing little to reverse this. The army responded with window dressing. There was even a popular joke at the time about generals ordering their soldiers to paint the grass green on the eve of an inspection.

Meanwhile, the Army's performance fighting a guerrilla war in Afghanistan was making it increasingly difficult to cover up its weaknesses. Gorbachev's decision to pull out in 1988, though unpopular with the top brass, may ironically have saved the army from a total loss of face.

This is not to say that Gorbachev was beloved of the common soldier. His ill-planned conversion of defense industry plants to civilian production and hasty withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe created massive dislocation and discontent.

A whole new level of pain

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant that the Russian Federation inherited the bulk of the Soviet army and its problems. The rebuilding process will be a protracted and painful one.

"Let's look at what we started with," responded Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to early criticism in 1992. "All our elite units with state-of-the-art equipment were left in Ukraine, while Russia was left with troops of the second strategic echelon."

The task of converting an outdated Cold War fighting machine into a motivated and efficient fighting force for the next century is a tall order by any measure. The young Defense Minister's earliest efforts were to restore basic discipline and to organize a proper chain of command (minus the political element). Russian generals have traditionally brought strong disciplinary pressure to bear on their officers. In the context of reform, it backfired.

These heavy-handed methods, combined with an inadequate response to the social problem's caused by declining budgets, massive troop re-locations, and falling morale, resulted in deep disillusionment among officers. Salaries for low-ranking officers today average just R800,000-R1 mn a month ($170-$210, or just enough to feed a family). At one time, servicemen were amongst the highest paid members of society.

As a result, many Russian officers are switching to business. Many seem to be putting their military know-how to good use -- iron self-discipline and the ability to work under stress have paid off for many under the new conditions. Many officers studying at the Lenin Military Academy work as kiosk vendors by night for as much as $300 per month, more than doubling their military salaries.

In such economic times, it is no wonder the Defense Ministry is 40% short of its full complement of young officers.

Desperation in some sections is such that they will recruit anyone, literally. The local press reports how Russia's formerly crack airborne troops have taken on men with criminal records because no one else would join. As a result, two men deserted from their unit with their weapons.

Meanwhile, Minister Grachev's consistently upbeat progress reports to the executive branch have mystified many observers. Not only has the decline of Russia's armed forces not been reversed, it has continued unabated. When confronted with these hard facts, the Defense Ministry has responded with a silent circling of the wagons.

But the war in Chechnya, like its predecessor in Afghanistan, has revealed the manifold weaknesses of today's army. Losses have been heavy: paratroopers claimed that during the attack on the capital, Grozny, on December 31st 1994, officers had no maps of the city and no defined military mission.

Even when it became obvious that the Chechen operation was a disaster, the Russian command refused to concede its mistakes. Now, with presidential elections looming, and the war dragging on, resignations are expected, and as the executive has been hinting for some time, Grachev will likely be the first to go.

Whence the threat to Russia ?

As a new Russian army develops, it is difficult to discern a clear-cut and legally-based military doctrine. This apparent lack of focus is exacerbated by the constant push and pull of competing political forces.

All things considered, however, a vision for the future is beginning to take shape. In December 1992, the government endorsed a set of guidelines for the look of the Russian defense program for the years 2000-2005. The General Staff has been asked to reduce personnel by 1.5 million. In early 1995, the army finally submitted to the government data for reviewing its mobilization plan, including for industry.

Meanwhile, a political foundation for the doctrine is starting to take shape.

"One of the major political components of the military doctrine is the theory that under present conditions our state has no likely adversaries," said First Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin.

"In the final analysis," he continued, "all efforts aimed at guaranteeing national military security must be aimed at promoting the consistent development of Russia as a democratic and economically prosperous state."

But Russia has a long way to go to attain economic prosperity. In the meantime, how will an impoverished and disoriented military/industrial complex provide an underpinning for national security?

The ministry's view is far from optimistic. The mechanism for financing military contracts is in a total disarray. At the same time, the ministry understands that the creation of a modern army will require substantially increased scientific research. But budgets are shrinking.

What is more, defense enterprises must now pay market prices for their raw materials, driving necessary equipment even further out of their financial reach.

For now, the main concern of military policy-makers is to keep alive the most vital and unique programs. The number of military contractors has been substantially reduced in order to make the remaining ones viable. For example, all construction work on Russian nuclear submarines is now taking place at just one facility, in Arkhangelsk.

A crisis of ideology

  Given the uncertainty and other problems facing Russia's military, it should come as no surprise that morale among soldiers is at a low ebb. While maintaining odious legacies from the Soviet Army, such as the brutal tradition of hazing new recruits, the new Russian Army is hemorrhaging badly. Young men of conscription age are dodging the draft in droves.

In response to worsening conditions of service, a powerful social movement, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, was formed to protect and give comfort to young recruits and draftees.

At the same time, more and more parents of potential conscripts are doing their utmost to keep their children out of the army. Usually this means money.

A year ago, the head of a district draft center in Moscow would Ômislay' an 18-year-old's draft papers for around $1,000. According to one reliable parental source, today's price could be as high as $10,000.

Those keen to get out of army service may not have to look very far for help. "If you don't want to serve in the army ...", begins a peculiar leaflet stuck up on a fence right beside the entrance to the Voyenkomat (draft center) of Moscow's Northern District.

But not everyone seeks this kind of assistance. On a recent Spring day, three young men walked into the center, ignoring the leaflet. All had come here of their own volition as soon as they received their call-up papers. In fact, third year student Andrei Ryabov, who is entitled to a temporary exemption from the army, left his institute to join his two comrades.

"I'll take things as they come," was his reaction to a question about the threat of hazing.

But these three don't call the tune among draftees. Those who can afford it are more likely to do like one young man who dared to publish an ad with his home number in the newspaper Iz ruk v ruki (From Hand to Hand): "Looking for someone who can exempt me from the army. Leonid."

Reasons for draft dodging range from fear of being sent to Chechnya to the more banal, "it's a waste of time."

"Generally speaking, I would like to join the army," 16-year-old Yuri Muravlyov told the international youth magazine Together. "It's a profound school of life. But they can make a cripple of you in the Russian army today and you will not be able to do anything with your life after that... I'd like to be in the army for a while if the legal protection of army personnel was ensured."

Draft dodger Leonid told Russian Life that he had canceled his ad ( he had already found the services of a psychiatrist for just 'four limony' ('lemons' –the Russian slang for millions).

'Fees' for false medical exemptions range between R4 mn and R5 mn. But this path is not without risk. A military psychiatrist in Nizhny Novgorod was recently found guilty of bribery after pocketing R3,895,000 for a false diagnosis.

Other doctors simply err on the side of caution, thus allowing many potential draftees to stay at home. In 1995, representatives of the Defense Ministry's Military Medical Commission who inspected the Moscow City Draft Assembly Point found that 24% of exemptions given to draftees for surgical reasons were unjustified. Likewise, the commission cited as inappropriate 18% of exemptions based on ear, nose and throat ailments, 10% based on internal diseases and 6% based on eye problems.

"We still fulfill our draft plan, but it's getting tougher year by year," said Colonel Nikolai Myskov, head of the Moscow Northern District draft center. "We are plagued by draft dodging. In most cases it's their parents who won't let them join the army."

"Let's face it," he continues, "very few draftees are proud to serve in the army. And their friends usually regard them as failures. Unlike most capitalist countries, Russia doesn't encourage its draftees with promises of career moves. A young draftee in the West who has done military service gains wide access to prestigious colleges and high schools and may be quickly promoted up the career ladder. That's why society should come up with some tangible incentives to motivate draftees to fulfill their patriotic duty."

In Moscow and the Moscow Region the problem of draft-dodging is more acute than elsewhere (there are too many VIPs using money and connections to help their kids escape the army). Racketeers, too, have their own methods of draft dodging. Voyenkomat heads get threatening, anonymous phone calls demanding that they stop sending call-up papers to certain draftees. Some draft board members have even been held at gunpoint by Mafia thugs.

Awkward attempts have been made to remedy the situation, some of which have dismayed liberal opinion. For one, the Defense Ministry persuaded the government to abolish the exemption for high-school students. And, in early 1996, President Yeltsin vetoed proposed legislation which would have shortened the term of service from 24 to 18 months for conscripts drafted before May 1995.

Meanwhile, the abolition of political organs and the end of communist indoctrination has left an ideological vacuum. Like elsewhere in Russian society, the Orthodox Church has stepped into the breach, trying to win souls and boost the faith of the troops. Minister Grachev regularly meets with Patriarch Alexy II and is often seen to cross himself in public. The Patriarchate, meanwhile, has set up a special department to liaise with the army. But even without enforced atheism, religious faith in this peacetime army remains a rarity.

By way of epilogue....

As if it didn't have enough problems of its own, the army has been regularly manipulated by political forces into no-win situations that have further tarnished its image. Recent high-profile examples include Tbilisi in 1989, Vilnius and the August 1991 and October 1993 coups.

Dissatisfied with the way it was being treated by the political leadership, the army retaliated in its own way: according to the Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, an overwhelming majority voted for ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the 1993 legislative elections. Sample polls of servicemen who voted in the December 1995 Duma elections indicate another big vote for Zhirinovsky.

Clearly, the army has been hit hard by the current transition. By the same token, perhaps only social upheaval of today's magnitude could have aroused this hidebound giant.

One thing is certain, it will take some time before the Russian army reaches the level of strength and prestige enjoyed even ten years ago. It is also obvious that the support of the army will be essential for the victor in the upcoming presidential elections. Whatever happens, the leadership will have to scrape around in Russia's meager treasury and take small but tangible steps toward improving the moral and financial state of Russian soldiers and officers. Charged with defending one-sixth of the earth, they deserve a better fate than that of part time kiosk vendors or simply pawns in a political game.

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