Is a New Cold War Brewing?

While Russians argued over what their country should do in reaction to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, an overwhelming majority of them agree over what NATO should not have done — i.e. bomb Yugoslavia. All of Russia’s major political, religious and social leaders have condemned the air strikes. And they have been supported by the vast majority of public opinion. Ominously, the war in Yugoslavia has incited a new anti-Western, and especially anti-American mood in Russia.

Russian Life sought to explore the origins and consequences of this mood-shift, and to that end Publisher Paul Richardson and Executive Editor Mikhail Ivanov met in Moscow on April 2 with the director of Russia’s prestigious USA-Canada Studies Institute, Sergei Rogov. Rogov has studied Russian-American relations for over 30 years, has lived in the US and advises the Russian government on policy toward the US. In fact, Rogov was to have been a member of the Russian delegation to the US in March, headed by [Former] Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who turned around in mid-flight when the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia began.

Paul Richardson: Nearly twenty years ago, in 1982, during my first visit to Russia, as we were entering an apartment building with some friends, they said to us, “Don’t speak English right now, it’s not safe.” Yesterday, we were going down a metro escalator, talking in English, and a young Russian girl in front of us turned and said, “Why are you guys speaking English so loudly? ... That’s not polite right now!” And today we heard how one radio announcer offered a play on words, that “nagloyazychnaya” (literally — “arrogantly-speaking”) be used instead of “angloyazychnye” (English-speaking). Are we going back to the early 1980s? Where is the US-Russian relationship going?

Sergei Rogov: I think what we face today is a very sad situation. Unfortunately now, seven or eight years after the end of the Cold War — the end of Soviet-American confrontation — we are experiencing maybe the worst crisis in Russian-American relations in many, many years. And this is a crisis which is not just limited to Yugoslavia. This is a crisis which covers all major areas of Russian-American relations. And unless we are able to resolve it, it can bring our two countries to confrontation or to disengagement.

So, first of all, we have to try to understand what happened, why the strategic partnership which was announced by Russia and the US at the beginning of the 1990s didn’t come true, was never implemented and turned out an empty phrase; and why we allowed our relations to deteriorate again to the point when Americans feel it’s not safe to speak English in the streets of Moscow, and not because they are followed by the KGB but because, well, ordinary citizens, may misinterpret when they hear the English language.

There are two reasons. I think both sides are guilty. We Russians are guilty because we failed to develop and implement a meaningful strategy of economic and political developments. And today Russia domestically is facing the consequences of unprecedented economic pressure with no light at the end of the tunnel. And it is premature to say that Russia has become a mature democracy. The key questions concerning Russia’s domestic developments for the next century haven’t been resolved. We are facing again the basic challenges. And the main problem is that we failed to establish our new identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And when a nation cannot identify its national interests, its strategy, it’s inevitable that you have wide zigzags in both domestic and foreign policy.

But, in my view, the main responsibility for the deterioration of Russian-American relations belongs to the US. Unlike Russia, the US didn’t have to experience the crisis of self-identity after the end of the cold war, you [the US] lost your main enemy but you didn’t have to go through anything comparable to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. And while we had seven lean years of economic depression, the US enjoys seven years of almost unprecedented economic growth, one even says that you never had it so good.

And maybe that’s the problem with American foreign policy. Because the end of the Cold War was interpreted as a total victory for the US. And thus, it seems to me, the US was not able to resist the temptation to act in accordance with the traditional rules of the game as they have always historically been played: the winner takes it all. ... This misperception of total victory created a situation when the Clinton administration came to power eight years ago with a completely different set of ideas as to how to deal with the post-Cold War world. And while [the US] might have been serious about strategic partnership with Russia and was really interested in multilateralism, step by step the US was sliding into unilateralism. As in American domestic politics, where Clinton robbed the Republican party of most of its issues ... the Democratic administration started to act more and more unilaterally either alone or relying on its Cold War American allies, ignoring the interests and the views of other international players, including Russia. And that created a perception that the US treats Russia as a defeated country, that the US wants to define the framework of the relationship, but that partnership is limited to the option that Russia is allowed to accept whatever the US decides to do.

A major wrong step was the decision to build, instead of the new security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok, an enlarged NATO. Because, in Russia, no one could understand why, when Russia is no longer a threat, the US should still rely on a military alliance and expand it, coming closer to Russia, when we cannot hurt [the West]? Unfortunately, the Russian view was misinterpreted in the West: that Russians are preoccupied with the military balance, that NATO enlargement is something which is not threatening to Russia and thus an issue which is of concern only to the Russian elite and not to the Russian people, who are preoccupied with the problems of daily survival and, like people anywhere, don’t care about foreign policy issues. But this outpouring of emotions which you experience in today’s Russia, it reflects something which goes far beyond the games of the political elite; [it is] the widespread feeling of the Russian people that we are mistreated, that we are humiliated, that we are mistrusted by the US and the West, and that the West still thinks that the best way to treat Russia is from position of strength. Thus, there is a direct link between the first crack in Russian-American partnership — which was done by an enlarged NATO — and the present, full-blown crisis related to NATO’s war in Yugoslavia.

If we look at the Russian -American relationship, there are three major “baskets.” And in all of them, we have very serious disagreements between Russia and the US, [disagreements] which have been growing for the last several years and which now have reached a crisis stage. And all this is happening simultaneously, overlapping and creating a resonating impact.

Let me clarify what I mean. The key issue in Russian-American relations, unlike the days of the Soviet-American confrontation, is the economic relationship. And that is something new, when the economic issues, not only trade and investment, but questions of foreign debt, are the first priority in Russian-American relations. Because the future of Russia’s economy — the future recovery of Russia depends on how these issues are going to be resolved. ... The US is dominant in the key international financial and economic institutions — the IMF, and World Bank. And thus the problems of the Russian foreign debt cannot be resolved without the US. And in fact the US can block any decisions which Russia badly needs ...

Russia cannot pay the foreign debt it has today because of the de facto bankruptcy of the Russian government, the continuation of economic recession and the lack of indication of any growth ... This foreign debt consists of two parts. First is the Soviet foreign debt, which could be perceived as the price for the Cold War defeat ... [which] is like the reparations which Germany had to pay after the First World War ... Second is the Russian debt, which was accumulated after the collapse of the Soviet Union and which represents a story of enormous waste, fraud and mismanagement. It is an unprecedented situation in terms of how much money was misspent, not because of corruption, bribery and all kinds of wheeling and dealing — which brought most of this money back into secret accounts in the West — but because the economic strategy linked to those trends turned out not to be a solution for Russia’s economic problems, but rather itself part of the problem. Thus, many in Russia perceive the debt issue as a kind of “American conspiracy” to destroy Russia. This corresponds with the Cold War stereotype of an American conspiracy to destroy the Soviet Union. Inevitably, what we have today is the perception — which is not totally psychological — of linkage: the US is trying to play like in the days of the Cold War, where questions like the restructuring of foreign debt, or payment of new credits to Russia to repay old debts, are linked to Russian behavior both internationally — e.g. Iraq, Kosovo, in the field of arms control, the ABM Treaty, START-II, etc. — and with Russian domestic developments.

.... The second area of Russian-American relations is arms control. We have today a situation where the arms control regime which we inherited at the end of the Cold War may totally collapse within the next several months. And that is related not only to this stupid and counter-productive refusal of the State Duma to ratify START-II, but also because previous strategic arms control agreements, including the ABM Treaty, are based on the notion of mutual nuclear deterrence ... [But now], there is no parity between Russia and the US ... and it seems that in the US there are people who think, “Well, why we should maintain strategic stability with Russia based on mutual nuclear deterrence, when Russia is so weak?”

.... Last December when the Duma finally agreed to vote [on START-II], the US attacked Iraq, despite Russia’s objections, just three or four days before the scheduled vote in the Duma. The same thing has happened now in Yugoslavia. Actually, the vote was scheduled for ... today [April 2], after Primakov would have come back from Washington ...

It is impossible to avoid the impression, that, well, the US is not really very interested in START-II ratification. Or at least that the US administration doesn’t think that ratification of START-II and further arms control reductions ... are more important than other priorities

... [Now] the US openly talks of a unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. This threat was made by Secretary [of Defense William] Cohen last January, when the US hadn’t even formulated what sort of modifications they wanted in the ABM Treaty. There are modifications and there are modifications. We changed the Protocol in 1972 and 1974, and one can expect, that, well, we can change the Protocol again. But here, the US administration indicates that if Russia refuses to accept American demands, which haven’t been formulated, they are going to do it anyway ... This is again a case where the US is trying to impose on Russia new rules of the game.

Finally, the last basket: regional conflicts. If in the early 1990s we had a situation where, instead of confrontation involving support of opposing sides in regional conflicts, Russia and the US started to cooperate, now the list of disagreements on regional issues seems to be as broad as during the Cold War. And if the Iraqi situation demonstrated that the US is ignoring Russia’s opinion, the Yugoslavian crisis is something which is driving the message home.

The mechanism which we have for joint decision-making to maintain international security is not used by the US, because the US doesn’t want to give Russia a “veto” over America’s use of military force. Thus, we have a situation where the legitimate international mechanisms which are authorized to use force — like the Security Council of the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation and the Permanent Joint Council — are bypassed by the US, which prefers to take decisions within the body where Russia is not represented by definition: the North-Atlantic Council. I think it is stupid to claim that Russia wants to veto American actions, because it is ridiculous that Luxembourg and Iceland, as members of NATO, may have both a voice or veto over a decision like starting a military attack in Yugoslavia, while Russia is left out. This is, in my view, an extremely dangerous policy, because if Russia concludes that the US is acting against Russia, not simply ignoring but acting against Russian interests, then we shall have the rules for the new geopolitical conflict of the 21st century. I hope this can be avoided.

It’s still not too late to put our relationship on the right track. And definitely this could happen if we could have mutual compromises which cover all three main areas of our relationship — economic issues, arms control, regional conflicts. It should be give and take. And I think that’s mutually beneficial and something which will allow both countries to gain. But if the US insists on a relationship where all decisions are taken by the US, while Russia is presented with a fait accomplit, I am afraid we are going to have a disastrous period in our relationship ...

Paul Richardson: There are those who would say that, given the differing nature of their geopolitical interests, their histories and national characters, Russia and the US will be, if not at odds, at best be cautious partners and global rivals.

Sergei Rogov: I am fifty years old and I spent 32 years studying the US, so maybe I have been brainwashed by the country which I study and where I have spent eight years. But I believe that, while we certainly have differences in our national characters, in some ways it’s easier for us to find a common language than, for instance, for Russians and Europeans, or for Russians and Chinese. Maybe because we both suffer from the curse of greatness. Maybe because we are both multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies. Maybe because we both have this experience of continental expansion. We quite often think in the same terms. And while we quite often both would make mistakes because of that, in my view, it’s a plus for our relations, it’s not a minus. It’s a possibility for us to find a common language.

... I reject the view that Russia and the US are doomed to be rivals forever. This view has not been proven by history because, well, in two World Wars, during the American War of Independence and the Civil War, we were in the same boat, and the [political] systems in Russia and the US were more different in those days than today. Again, I don’t claim that we are a mirror of the American system, but tsarist Russia or Soviet Russia were not closer to the US than present-day Russia. So what we have is a half-century of confrontation and tremendous inertia. But, in my view, it doesn’t predetermine a perpetual Russian-American rivalry.

Mikhail Ivanov: Can you explain in simple terms to the average American why the reaction in Russia was so negative to the bombing of Yugoslavia. Is it simply a reaction to bombing another people to solve political problems?

Sergei Rogov: Well, I would like to say so, but we did bomb Chechnya ... But here the question is about double standards. Why do the Kosovars deserve independence and Chechens don’t? Why do Estonians deserve independence and the Kurds don’t? Why is NATO not bombing Turkey, which is pursuing a similarly ugly ethnic war like what took place in Kosovo? So, we are back to the situation when we have double standards and we look at people in the same situation but define them in terms of freedom fighters and terrorists with the definition depending on who is the freedom fighter and who is the terrorist ... Just this morning I had the report on the Internet that the Northern Ireland negotiations failed - should we bomb London ? ... We need to build a comprehensive international security system based on international law which provides everyone with equal standards, equal rules of the game. One can blame Russia for not doing enough ... but I would blame the US even more because, whether we like it or not, the US has a much stronger position from which to provide the leadership to build this new situation...   

Mikhail Ivanov: What do you think could be the very next steps, the immediate gives and takes on both sides which could start turning the clock back towards an improvement of the bilateral relations?

Sergei Rogov: First of all, let’s speak about how to prevent a further deterioration of Russian-American relations. For today, unfortunately, we have become hostages of the situation in Yugoslavia. Apparently there is no military solution to the problem. NATO can bomb, but they can hardly defray the Yugoslavs’ resolve. Does it mean that NATO wants to send ground troops, wage another Vietnam for years? I don’t think it’s going to happen. Thus we must have a political solution. And if we talk about a political solution, it is clear that Russia has a strong position to be fully engaged in a negotiated political settlement. In fact, at the Rambouillet negotiations, Russia was presented with a fait accomplit, because Russia didn’t sign the agreements which the Western powers and the Kosovar delegation signed. And that was ignored by our partners in the contact group.

Paul Richardson: If Russia had signed, you think that Milosevic would have fallen in line ?

Sergei Rogov: That might have happened, but we wouldn’t have signed this document, because the document was clearly very one-sided. Well, one can speculate about what kind of political solution to the Kosovo problem one can have. I personally believe that the maximum political autonomy for the Kosovars is the solution. I also know that ... most of the Kosovars, like most Chechens, want full independence. And especially after the recent bloodshed, it would be very difficult for them to stay within Yugoslavia unless there is a true peacekeeping mission. Thus, well, the political settlement which, in my view, is acceptable for both Russia and the US as partners (preservation of sovereignty of the present Yugoslavia) can hold ground only if we have an international peacekeeping force. I don’t think that NATO, after it has waged a war against Yugoslavia, can continue to insist that it can be an impartial peacekeeper in Kosovo. So, the international peacekeeping force has to be organized under the auspices of the Security Council of the United Nations or the OSCE. Or some other international arrangement, but not NATO directly.

Paul Richardson: Similar to what we’ve done in Bosnia, with Russian troops?

Sergei Rogov: No, the Bosnian arrangement in fact is a pretty bad arrangement ... It can collapse within a minute, today or tomorrow because, both politically and militarily, Russia is not integrated into IOSO. So, the peacekeeping force I am talking about is possible if Russia is fully integrated politically in the decision-making. And that means that the decision-making body is not NATO, not the North-Atlantic Council, but the Security Council or the OSCE or the Permanent Joint Council or something like that, where Russia is fully involved and has a veto. And that, of course, allows full integration of Russia ... I presume that, in that case, the question of Western involvement in the peacekeeping force will be quite important. And maybe the solution would include a participation on the ground by those NATO members who were not involved in the air war against Yugoslavia. So that means there is a half-dozen NATO countries which didn’t directly participate in the war against Yugoslavia and they can send their troops to the peacekeeping force, together with some Islamic countries, Scandinavian countries, etc. Well, the new members of NATO, the troika [Poland, Czech & Slovak Republics, Hungary] didn’t participate, so they also could included together with Russians, Ukrainians, etc. So that’s the first priority.

The second issue which might coincide in time, because the decision has to be taken sometime in May-June, is the restructuring of Russian foreign debt. We badly need this restructuring. If it is not negotiated, then Russian formal default is involved. And that, of course, means the kinds of economic isolation of Russia like during the containment of the Cold War. Because legally Russia becomes an economic pariah: we don’t pay our bills, so, well, anybody can sue us. That also means there will be no investment, no food imports on which Russia depends, and maybe problems with the export of Russian oil & gas, because the assets will be arrested.

The third priority is to resume the arms control process. Apparently, we cannot forever refuse to ratify START-II and negotiations on START-III and modification of the ABM Treaty will be linked. But I think we can find a solution which will allow us to maintain strategic stability at a much lower numerical level, all the way to one thousand nuclear warheads. And minor changes in the Protocol of 1974 to the ABM Treaty should not undermine the essence of the Treaty, which prohibits the territorial [air] defense. So what I am talking about is a set of mutual compromises.

Unfortunately, I don’t see the US today thinking in such terms, nor is the Russian domestic political situation good for rational decision-making. So, in both countries we have domestic political considerations and sometimes an emotional hysteria pushing us into a situation where we can commit blunders with really tragic consequences.

Paul Richardson: Grigory Yavlinsky [leader of the Yabloko Duma faction] said in an interview last night that Russia should react negatively to the bombing of Yugoslavia, but that an overly emotional reaction risks pushing Russian domestic opinion into the arms of the Communists and Nationalists.

Sergei Rogov: I remember when I came to the US as representative of the [USA and Canada] Institute, right after the [downing of flight] KAL-007. I was shy to speak Russian with wife and my children when we were in town ... It was 1983. And it was not simply the FBI [I was thinking about], it was, well, the emotional reaction. Now we know much better the facts relevant to the Korean airline ... And now we have the KLA — the Kosovo Liberation Army, the same three letters, which push us to these emotional outpourings.

... I think one has to give credit to [Prime Minister] Yevgeny Primakov who, under the circumstances in my opinion, despite pressures from all sides, managed to avoid any decisions which could be perceived as irresponsible ... But the situation can change. Unfortunately, Russian-American relations are so fragile that not only a big issue — like the ABM Treaty or NATO — but something totally uncontrollable, like some crazy shooting at the American embassy or an attack on American citizens in Moscow or Russian citizens who may become victims of NATO bombing in Belgrade, or the [Russian] volunteers etc., etc., etc. — these issues can push us in a direction which nobody wants us to go. So, the situation is extremely tense and the next two months will probably be a decisive period for Russian-American relations.  RL