Red Army Day

In February 1918, with the war in the East winding down,  German forces launched a major offensive that threatened the fledgling Soviet government in Petrograd (formerly St. Petersburg).  On the 22nd of that month, Lenin appealed to the Russian people in his now famous address: "The Socialist fatherland is in danger." The resulting mobilization helped the Red Army to halt the German advance and preserve the Revolution.  Since that time, February 23 has been celebrated as Red Army Day, and since the collapse of communism, Russian Army Day.

^{Over the last few years, Russian servicemen have celebrated their Day with mixed feelings. The history of the Russian army can be divided into periods of crushing victories, pyrrhic victories and humiliating defeats. Russian history enthusiasts can easily recall the triumphs of Peter the Great's Northern War against Sweden, the humiliation of Prussia in the Seven Years War, Catherine the Great's Turkish campaigns and the dismantling of Napoleon's Grand ArmŽe.}

Yet nothing can erase from the history books such national disasters as the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the fateful Great War of 1914-17.

Russian military crises have historically had far-reaching consequences for society as a whole. The Bolsheviks came to power in 1917 by harnessing the discontent provoked by the Tsar's mishandling of the war with Germany.

The Red Army: invincible and legendary

^{Nobody can say that the Bolsheviks didn't then put their money where their mouths were, either: They succeeded in forging a highly disciplined and effective fighting force that was capable of defeating the combined armies of the White Russians and numerous foreign interventionists. Most Red Army soldiers were peasants and workers, while officers were often sergeants or lieutenants from tsarist units who had gone over to the Reds.}

In the midst of critical famine and economic collapse, the young Soviet government spared no resource in training, arming and feeding its army. Lenin gave the highest priority to winning the loyalty of his soldiers – a prerequisite for any regime which had placed itself in opposition to the world.

According to this early model, iron discipline was achieved through intensive political education,  suppression of individuality, and fear of severe punishment. This regime was enforced by cadres of political commissars with the authority to countermand officers' orders. Anyone who grew up in the Soviet Union remembers the famous scene from the movie Chapayev, where the Civil War hero argues with his unit's commissar over who is in charge.

"Don't you know who I am? – Chapayev!!!" declared the hero.

"And I am Furmanov, your commissar," answered Furmanov with all the smugness of a man with the power of the Communist Party behind him.

Further, the Cheka secret police had infamous Special Departments (Osobiye Otdely) attached to the army. Their mission was to root out counter-revolutionaary plots, thoughts and ideas, providing both counter-intelligence and ideological support.

In the 1930s, these same special departments, under the guidance of the NKVD (predecessor of the KGB), helped to gut the Red Army's officer corps during Stalin's purges.

^{Many of those arrested represented the cream of the Russian army. As experienced officers were shot or sent to the camps, inexperienced lieutenants were quickly promoted up the chain of command to replace them.}

The Great Patriotic War.

The true cost of Stalin's purges became evident when Hitler invaded in 1941, throwing the unprepared Russians into chaos and driving virtually to the gates of Moscow. However, the Soviets learned quickly, and managed to turn a headlong retreat into an orderly strategic withdrawal, eventually stemming the German advance and even gaining the strategic advantage.

The Soviet military command was able to mobilize tremendous human resources, as patriotic citizens rushed to defend the motherland. Volunteers dismissed for health reasons would keep turning up until they found a way to enlist. Heroism at the front, in the factories, and behind enemy lines was so commonplace, that Russians came to call World War Two the Great Patriotic War.

^{One must also pay homage to the talent and abnegation of such outstanding military leaders of the Red Army during WWII as Georgi Zhukov,  who took his place next to great Russian generals of the past like Suvorov and Kutuzov. Zhukov, who fought in the First World War, then joined the Bolsheviks in 1918, rose through the ranks, and somehow navigated the purges unscathed to lead every crucial military operation of the Second World War, including the defense of Moscow, the relief of Leningrad and the crucial battle at Kursk. He also masterminded the Soviet advance to Berlin and represented the Soviet government at the Nazi capitulation in 1945.}

^{Nevertheless, as war veteran Yuri Alexandrov recalls,  even Zhukov didn't always think of keeping human losses to a minimum while planning a military operation. Many Soviet generals would throw as many soldiers as they had into the attack, just to take by storm some high ground or a village by the deadline set by the Stavka  (Supreme Command) and avoid awkward phone calls from Stalin, who always made contact in emergencies.}

The late Colonel-General Dmitri Volkogonov (a renowned expert on Soviet history who died in late 1995) commented thus shortly before his death:

"Without diminishing the military talent of Soviet commanders, I have to admit that victories in the Great Patriotic War were often achieved not by savoir faire but by numbers, when in just two hours thousands of soldiers and hundreds of officers could perish."

The unjustifiably heavy price the country paid for its victory only became a matter for broad public discussion with the progression of perestroika, but immediately after the war nobody ever thought of questioning the authority of the Red Army. It emerged from the war as an undeniable victor and its prestige within Soviet society was stronger than ever.

Civilians who met a man in a military uniform would embrace him and lift him into the air in triumph. Even thugs and bandits adopted an unwritten code not to set upon men in uniform.

The Post War Period.

Having proved its importance for national security, the Army took the place it deserved within the state.  The ruling Communist Party hardly ever refused the Armed Forces anything. Nor were  generals shy to ask.  Every fourth Soviet citizen worked directly or indirectly for the defense industry.

All scientific and technical discoveries and inventions were considered first and foremost from the point of view of their applicability  for the military, and only after that for civil purposes. For example, all cigarette factories  were structured in such a way that they could easily switch over to the production of bullets. Compare the caliber of bullets used in the Army with the "caliber' of Russian cigarettes.

Enter perestroika

All high-ranking military commanders of the late Soviet period believe that Gorbachev's perestroika triggered the collapse of the army. Former Soviet defense ministers Marshals Sergei Sokolov and Dmitri Yazov and Army General Valentin Varennikov have said so many times... But the generals are being economical with the truth.

^{In fact, by the time the USSR fell apart, the Soviet Army, like Soviet society as a whole, was rotten to the core. The government continued to pump money into it, which did little to increase efficiency  its obsolete model of military command and primitive theories about the formation of military forces were at odds with reality.}

Window dressing in the army was flourishing.  There was a popular joke at the time about generals ordering their soldiers to paint the grass green on the eve of an inspection.

Meanwhile, the Army failed the Afghan test  its inadequate performance against a guerilla enemy revealed a low military potential. However, Gorbachev's decisiveness in pulling the troops out of Afghanistan in 1988 helped to stop a further deterioration in army morale and faith in its true role.

This is not to say that everything Gorbachev did helped the army improve performance and morale. Conversion of defense industry plants to civilian production was ill thought out and rushed. Deep cuts in personnel and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe without consistent financial and social support on their return added fuel to the fire of the military dissent.   

New times, new difficulties

The newly independent Russian Federation started to build its new army on the ruins of the old. This process is protracted and painful, with inevitable mistakes, some so serious that at times the army seems like social and political dynamite just waiting to explode. When in late 1992 defense minister Pavel Grachev was accused of dragging his feet with military reform, he took offense.

"Let's look at what we started with," he responded. "All our elite units with state-of-the-art equipment were left in Ukraine, while Russia was left with troops of the second strategic echelon."

His main concern was to restore basic discipline among the troops and organize a proper military command. The young minister  didn't have the necessary experience in managing such a complex and huge military and political mechanism as a modern army. Russian generals brought strong disciplinary pressure to bear on their officers. As a result their desire to enhance discipline was discredited by the means they used to achieve it.

^{This administrative pressure, not backed up by effective  solutions to servicemen's social problems, resulted in deep disillusionment among officers, who lost all faith and incentive to serve in the army.  The salaries of low ranking officers average just R800,000-R1 mn a month ($170-$210).  This is just enough to feed an officer's family. At one time, servicemen were amongst the highest paid members of the society.}

As a result, many Russian officers switched to business. Many seem to be putting their military know-how to good use  iron self-discipline and ability to work under stress have made many successful. Many officers studying at the Lenin Military Academy  are working at night as kiosk vendors making about R1,5 mn, a significant supplement to their meager salaries.

^{It's no wonder, then, that the Defense Ministry is about 40% short of its quota of young officers.}

Alas, Pavel Grachev did not have the guts to deviate from the path of conformism to overcome objective obstacles. Following in the wake of Soviet generals, he started giving the President and government upbeat reports  about up-and-running military reform. In reality, though, problems in the Russian army were just piling up and the disintegration of the system itself continued. And this mere fact became the main mystery of the Defense Ministry, which has today shrouded itself in secrecy.

But the secret has been exposed quite fast. The war in Sheeny, especially its initial period, revealed the professional incompetence of the Russian army. Losses were heavy: paratroopers said that during the New Year's Eve attack on the capital, Grozny, when officers had no maps of the city and no defined military mission, battalions had an average life expectancy of eight minutes.

Even when it became obvious that the Chechen operation had failed, however, Pavel Grachev didn't have the courage to admit his mistakes. We can hardly expect any radical changes in the Russian army in the near future.

(At  press time, Russian generals were again being accused by the country's  political leadership of negligence, after Chechens raided a hospital in the Russian autonomous republic of Dagestan and took thousands of hostages).

^{Whence the threat to Russia ?}

The other problem with the Russian army is that it is being created without a clear-cut  and legally-based military doctrine. The Ministry of Defense has to play it by ear. And all because of political squabbles.

Under the circumstances, though, one must acknowledge that the Ministry has achieved some results. In early 1995 it finally submitted to the government new data for reviewing the mobilization plan, including for industry. In December 1992 the government endorsed guidelines of the armaments program for the period 2000-2005.  The General Staff has come up with a new structure intended to reduce the number of personnel to 1.5 mn.

Military leaders have also tried to create a political foundation for the doctrine.

^{"One of the major political components of the military doctrine is the theory of the state leadership that under present conditions our state has no likely adversaries," said First Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin.}

"In the final analysis," he continued, "all efforts aimed at guaranteeing national military security must be aimed at promoting the consistent development of Russia as a democratic and economically prosperous state."

^{However, Kokoshin is only partly right.  Russia has a long way to go to attain economic prosperity. It's more important to define military and technical priorities in new economic and political conditions. Is the military industry, much weakened by ill-conceived conversion, capable of providing the necessary technical support for the new military doctrine?}

The ministry's view is far from optimistic. The mechanism for financing military contracts is in a total disarray.  In the near future Russia will need to increase its budget for scientific research. Where will the money come from?

For now, the main concern of the military industrial complex is to keep at least the most precious and unique types of production. The number of contractors among military design bureaus have been substantially decreased in order to make the remainder viable. For example, all construction work on Russian nuclear submarines is concentrated at just one shipyard, Arkhangelsk's Sevmash.

Besides, all defense enterprises are getting raw materials at market prices, hence the high cost of production, now well above that of civil equivalents. The bottom line is that the transition to a market economy is far from over, while military production costs have already hit the ceiling.

^{Bad mood}

^{Last but not least, the Russian army is plagued with deteriorating morale. Having inherited all the woes of the Soviet army (such as hazing) it has added its own  like draft dodging. A powerful social movement, called Soldier's Mothers, was formed in response to hazing and other harassment faced by young soldiers. Parents of potential conscripts do their best to prevent their kids from serving in the army.}

But this kind of protection requires money. A year ago, a head of a Moscow district draft center would take $1,000 in bribes for not sending draft papers to each 18-year-old. According to reliable parent's sources, in 1995 bribe rates soared to $10,000.

As a result, military units are severely understaffed. To remedy the situation, the Defense Ministry persuaded the government to abolish the exemption for high school students.  At the very beginning of 1996, President Yeltsin vetoed Duma legislation which would have shortened the draft term from 24 to 18 months for soldiers drafted before May 1995.

After the abolition of political organs, the army leadership has never been able to fill the ideological gap properly. The Orthodox Church, however, is trying to win souls and enhance the faith of troops. Minister Grachev regularly meets Russia's Patriarch Alexi II and has even learnt how to cross himself in public. The Patriarchate, meanwhile, has set up a special department to liaise with the army. But surveys show that only a very small percentage  of Russian servicemen are true believers. Spiritual values have not yet filled the vacuum left by socialist ideals.

^{By way of epilogue....}

^{The army has had more than its fair share of intervention on the political arena, and becoming the scapegoat if anything goes wrong. The list of incidents is long and tragic: Tbilisi 1989, Vilnius January 1991, the August coup of 1991 and the October 1993 conflict in Moscow are just a few examples.}

Dissatisfied with the way it was being treated by the political leadership, the army retaliated in his own way: an overwhelming majority voted for ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the 1993 legislative elections.  Sample polls of servicemen who voted in the December 1995 Duma elections show another big vote for Zhirinovsky.

Clearly it will take some time before the Russian army reaches the level of strength and prestige it once enjoyed. It is also obvious that the support of the army will be essential for the victor in the upcoming presidential elections. Whatever happens, the leadership will have to scramble around in Russia's meager treasury and take small but tangible steps to improve the moral and financial state of Russian soldiers and officers. Charged  with defending one-sixth of the earth, they deserve a better fate than that of part time kiosk vendors or simply pawns in a political game.